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ABSTRACT
VOLHA BELSKAYA: Essays on the Expansion of Higher Education.
(Under the direction of Klara S. Peter)
Over the past twenty years, many developing countries expanded their higher education in order
to become more competitive on international markets in future. The largest developing countries,
Brazil, India, and Russia, tripled the number of college students per 100,000, and China increased
the number of students twelve-fold. This expansion led to the influx of college graduates into
the labor market, which had to adjust to the increase in the supply of educated workers. Existing
literature shows how the adjustments associated with college expansion happen but many questions
remain unanswered.
This dissertation evaluates the expansion of higher education in Russia and the effect of ex-
pansion on Russian labor market. The dissertation focuses on two features of the expansion. First,
college expansion is usually associated with an increasing participation of women in college edu-
cation. When the share of educated female workers grows faster than the share of educated male
workers, the gender gap in higher education narrows. Between 1990 and 2008, the number of fe-
male students in higher education in Russia tripled from 1.4 to 4.3 million and the share of female
students rose from 50 to 58 percent. The first chapter estimates education externalities created
by the educated men and women in the labor markets and evaluates whether the faster growth of
college participation among women affects the gender wage gap through education externalities.
Second, during the expansion many new campuses open, providing the access to college to indi-
viduals who were previously constrained. The second chapter co-authored with Klara S. Peter and
Christian M. Posso evaluates whether the expansion of higher education is economically worth-
while based on a recent surge in the number of campuses and college graduates in Russia. The em-
pirical strategy relies on the marginal treatment effect method in both normal and semi-parametric
versions, and estimating policy-influenced treatment parameters for the marginal students who are
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directly affected by college expansion. Both of these questions associated with college expan-
sion are heavily understudied in economics and this is where my dissertation contributes to the
literature.
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CHAPTER 1
THE GENDER GAP IN HIGHER EDUCATION IN RUSSIA: THE IMPACT ON THE
GENDER WAGE GAP THROUGH EDUCATION EXTERNALITIES
1.1 Introduction
Growing participation of women in higher education has become common in many developed
and developing countries. Between 1970 and 2011, the number of male students in tertiary educa-
tion quadrupled from 19 to 90 million while the number of female students rose seven-fold from
13 to 92 million (Bank (2014)).1 Together with higher female graduation rates, it led the share
of women with tertiary education to exceed that of men in many regions of the world.2 Despite
this achievement in female educational attainment, it may not necessarily lead to improvements in
women’s labor markets outcomes compared to those of men. The goal of this chapter is to estimate
the effect of the narrowing of the gender education gap on the wage gap between male and female
workers.
The relationship between the narrowing of the gender education gap and the gender wage gap
has started to gain an increasing attention in the literature. Gayle and Golan (2012) suggest that
over the past decades a decline in the gender education gap might have been one of the sources of
the reduced gender earnings gap in the U.S. Autor and Wasserman (2013) show that the reversal
of the gender gap in college enrollment in the U.S. coincided with larger gains in earnings among
college educated females compared to college educated males, i.e., between 1979 and 2010, real
hourly wages of 25-39-year old female college graduates grew by 24 percent compared to 13
percent wage growth among educated male workers. As a result, the gender gap in earnings among
1Between 1970 and 2011, male and female population of tertiary age increased by 88 and 86 percent, respectively
(Bank (2014)). Therefore, higher growth of female college enrollment was not driven by changes in the relative cohort
size.
2In 2012, female graduation ratio in tertiary (ISCED 5A) education exceeded male graduation ratio in 52 out of 62
sampled countries (Bank (2014)).
25-39-year old college graduates declined from 32 percentage points in 1979 to 19 percentage
points in 2010. Goldin (2014) suggests that over the last three decades a decline in the U.S.
gender gap in earnings has largely been due to an increase in the productive human capital of
female relative to male workers. Current predictions indicate that the share of female students
will continue to grow, which will lead to a further increase in the tertiary education gap favoring
females (OECD (2012)).
One channel through which the stock of educated workers affects their wages is education
externalities. Positive education externalities arise when growth in the number of educated work-
ers increases aggregate workers’ productivity through the sharing of knowledge and skills among
workers (Lucas (1988)) or induces a skill-biased technological change (Acemoglu (1998)). Higher
aggregate productivity as well as higher demand for labor increase equilibrium wages. When
female educational attainment grows faster than the educational attainment of males, wages of
female workers may grow faster than wages of male workers for two reasons. First, changes in
the aggregate productivity of female workers may exceed those of males, which leads to a higher
growth of female wages and a decrease in the gender wage gap. Second, skill-biased technological
change favoring female workers leads to a higher increase in female wages (Parro (2012)).3 This
chapter tests the hypothesis that the narrowing of the gender education gap leads to the changes in
the gender wage gap because of the existence of education externalities.
This chapter uses a longitudinal survey of Russia, one of the largest developing countries,
which experienced a reversal of the gender gap in higher education a decade ago. In Russia, the
expansion of higher education was accompanied by a rapidly growing number of female students
whose share reached 56 percent in 2011 and led to the reversal of the gender gap in higher education
in the early 2000s (Figure 2.1).
One of the main challenges associated with establishing a causal relationship between the share
of educated individuals and wages is the endogeneity problem. The share of college graduates in
the labor market is likely to be correlated with wages for several reasons. First, workers with higher
3Parro (2012) provides some examples of skill-biased technological changes favoring females such as the intro-
duction of computers.
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levels of unobserved ability may choose to work in the labor markets with better-educated labor if
those markets reward unobserved ability more. In this case, the estimate of the effect of college
share on wages will be biased upward if the ability measure is omitted from the wage equation.
Second, unobserved characteristics of the labor market may attract more educated workers. For
example, a labor market characterized by high productivity of educated workers pays higher wages,
which attracts more educated workers to the area.4 To address the endogeneity problem, this
chapter implements an instrumental variable strategy. An instrument for the share of individuals
with higher education should affect college education of the majority of workers in a given labor
market but should not be correlated with contemporaneous region-specific shocks. The number of
college campuses in the past, 20 years before education and wages are recorded, represents such an
instrument. This identification strategy parallels the one of Moretti (2004) and Muravyev (2008),
who use the supply of higher education institutions in cities in the U.S. and Russia, respectively, to
identify education externalities.
The chapter shows that in response to the growing share of educated individuals the wages
of educated females grew faster than the wages of educated males and this contributed to the
narrowing of the gender wage gap over time. Thus, increasing the access to higher education for
women in developing countries generates benefits through education externalities. Male workers
also benefit from the expansion of college education but the benefit for them, compared to female
workers, is smaller.
The chapter contributes to several strands of the literature. First, it contributes to the literature
on human capital externalities. Existing studies primarily ignore the possibility that human capital
externalities may differ by gender. Some of the studies estimate education externalities for male
workers only (Acemoglu and Angrist (2001); Conley and Tsiang (2003); Iranzo and Peri (2009);
Kirby and Riley (2008); Lange and Topel (2006)). Other studies include a dummy variable for gen-
der in the wage equation to account for the gender wage gap but do not interact the share of college
4The internet boom in the 1990s drove up the demand for educated workers, increased their wages and attracted
more of them to the Silicon Valley in California (Moretti (2004)).
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graduates with a gender dummy (Ciccone and Peri (2006); Dalmazzo and de Blasio (2007a), Dal-
mazzo and de Blasio (2007b); Liu (2007); Muravyev (2008); Rauch (1993); Sand (2013)). Moretti
(2004) is the only study that tests for the difference in human capital externalities between male and
female workers. The study does not reject the hypothesis of their equality. Despite that, education
externalities may differ by gender. For example, a higher share of skilled workers in the labor force
implies a larger market size for skill-complementary technologies and encourages faster produc-
tivity upgrading of skilled workers (Acemoglu (1998)). An increase in the supply of skills induces
skill-biased technological change and increases the skill premium. Therefore, a faster growth in
the supply of female skills may lead to a faster growth in the female skill premium. Parro (2012)
suggests that the recent skill-biased technological change favors female workers more than males
and improves their labor market outcomes. In case of equal education externalities across genders,
a faster increase in the share of educated females may lead to a higher growth of female wages and
a subsequent decrease in the gender wage gap. This chapter contributes to the literature by esti-
mating education externalities by gender and linking the changes in education externalities to the
changes in the gender wage gap. Additionally, this chapter accounts for the nonrandom selection
of individuals into employment by means of the inverse propensity weighting method.
Second, the chapter contributes to the literature on the increasing participation of women in
tertiary education (Autor and Wasserman (2013); Becker and Murphy (2010); Ganguli (2013);
Goldin (2006); Parro (2012)). While most of the literature focuses on the U.S., the analysis of other
countries which experience similar changes but differ from the U.S. in their economic conditions,
labor markets, and institutions is important. This is the first paper that documents the reversal of
the gender gap in higher education in one of the largest developing countries and analyzes its effect
on the labor market.
Third, the chapter contributes to the literature on changes in the gender wage gap over time
(Blau and Kahn (1997), Blau and Kahn (2000), Blau and Kahn (2006); Goldin (2006), Goldin
(2014), among others). Finally, the use of the number of campuses in the past as an instrument
for the contemporaneous share of college graduates builds on the applications of the supply-side
shifters in identifying education externalities, such as an increase in the supply of higher education
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in a province due to an educational reform (Bratti and Leombruni (2014)), the presence of a land-
grant college in a city (Iranzo and Peri (2009); Moretti (2004)), or the number of universities in a
city before the transition to a market economy (Muravyev (2008)).
1.2 The Reversal of the Gender Gap
1.2.1 World Trend in the Gender Gap in Higher Education
Over the last decades, female college participation has grown steadily around the world. While
there were seven female students per ten male students in tertiary education in 1970, the ratio
had grown to ten female students per ten male students by 2011 (Bank (2014)). Starting from the
1970s, more females than males entered tertiary education in each subsequent cohort and, as a
result, the share of educated females grew faster than the share of educated males over time. Panel
A of Figure 2.2 depicts the difference between the share of 25-34-year old males and females
with complete tertiary education (gender gap in tertiary education). The gap declined from 2.6
percentage points in 1970 to -2.3 percentage points in 2010, i.e., while the share of males with
tertiary education exceeded the share of females by 2.6 percentage points in 1970, today the share
of females with tertiary education exceeds that of males by 2.3 percentage points.
The observed decline in the gender education gap occurred in many geographic regions, except
for South Asia and the Middle East (Panel C), and North Africa (Panel D).5 The speed of the
decline, however, varied by region, with a more rapid change occurring in European and East and
Central Asian countries (Panel B of Figure 2.2). In developed countries, the gap changed from
being positive in 1970 to negative in 2010 (Figure 2.3). On the other hand, not all developing
countries experienced a reversal of the gender gap in tertiary education. Figure 2.4 depicts the
evolution of the gap in four largest developing countries, Brazil, Russia, India, and China, which
experienced a rapid growth of higher education over the last decades. Brazil and Russia followed
the worldwide trend of a declining gender education gap, while India and China had a constant or
even increasing gender gap in education (Figure 2.4). Russia experienced the largest decline in the
5South Asia and Middle East and North Africa represent regions with high fertility rates, low educational attain-
ment, and limited access of girls to education.
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gender education gap.
Existing literature attributes the growing number of women obtaining college education to the
emerging differences in the costs and benefits of college education across genders. Studies on
gender-specific costs of college education show that girls’ preparedness for college and their lower
nonpecuniary (effort) costs of college preparation increase their college attainment compared to
boys. Specifically, an improvement in girls’ high school preparedness (Goldin (2006)), the diverg-
ing high school graduation rates between boys and girls (Heckman and LaFontaine (2010)), and the
non-cognitive behavioral factors (Jacob (2002)) provide an explanation for the females’ advantage
in the probability of continuing to college. While in college, higher non-cognitive skills explain
higher female college completion rates compared to males and the widening of college comple-
tion rates between male and female students over time (Becker and Murphy (2010); Pekkarinen
(2012)). Another strand of the literature attributes some part of the increase in female college en-
rollment to an increase in the labor market benefits from college education, which include higher
female returns to education (Charles and Luoh (2003); Dougherty (2005)).
1.2.2 The Reversal of the Gender Education Gap in Russia
Over the last two decades, the largest developing countries experienced an expansion of higher
education (Carnoy and Wang (2013)). In Russia, the expansion was initiated in the early 1990s,
when public universities received a permission to open tuition-based programs and private colleges
and universities to operate in the market of higher education. Over the next decade, the total
number of colleges and universities in Russia more than doubled (Figure 2.1). A notable feature
of the expansion was a significantly higher participation of women in college. Between 1990 and
2008, the number of female students in higher education tripled from 1.4 to 4.3 million and the
share of female students rose from 50 to 58 percent (Panels A and B of Figure 2.1).
Higher female college participation had an impact on the educational composition of popu-
lation across geographic regions. Between 1989 and 2002, the share of female population with
complete higher education grew across all regions while the share of educated male population
6
stagnated in some areas (Panels A and B of Figure 2.5). Between 2002 and 2010, the share of ed-
ucated male and female population increased universally across regions (Panels C and D of Figure
2.5). The growth in the share of educated individuals occurred together with a growing dispersion
of gender-specific human capital across regions. In the 2000s, the share of educated males and
females increased more in the regions with the highest share of educated individuals in 2002 (Pan-
els C and D of Figure 1.6). Table C.1 shows that the interquartile range of the share of educated
males increased from 2.3 percentage points in 2002 to 3.6 percentage points in 2010 and from 2.2
percentage points in 2002 to 3.7 percentage points in 2010 among females. The difference between
the 90th and the 10th percentile of the share of population with higher education also increased
more rapidly among females and exceeded that of males in 2010. Thus, female human capital
became more dispersed across regions over time.6
To graph the relationship between the changes in the educational composition of population
and wages over time, Figure 1.7 plots the region-level wage changes against the changes in the
fraction of population with higher education in the 1990s and the 2000s. Panels A and B show a
negative relationship between the two variables in the 1990s for males and females while Panels C
and D show that the relationship became positive in the 2000s. Between 2002 and 2010, regions
with the fastest growing share of educated individuals experienced the highest wage increases, and
the relationship between the two was stronger for female population.
The faster growth of female college participation resulted in a reversal of the gender gap in
higher education in Russia. In 2002, the share of female population with higher education ex-
ceeded the share of educated males by 0.8 percentage points (Panel C of Figure 2.1). Between
2002 and 2010, the share of educated females grew faster than that of males, which led to a three-
percentage-point gender education gap in favor of females in 2010. The evolution of the gender
education gap in the U.S. follows a similar pattern, however, the gap in higher education closed
only recently (Panel D of Figure 2.1). Changes in the gender education gap are primarily driven
6Selective migration across regions is unlikely to be responsible for the observed changes. Compared to other
developed and developing countries, Russia has relatively low migration across regions (Andrienko and Guriev (2004);
Guriev and Vakulenko (2014)).
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by the younger cohorts. However, while in Russia the share of educated young females was al-
ready higher than the share of young males in late 1980s, a small gap in favor of educated young
males existed in the U.S. in 1990. In Russia, the gender gap in higher education between young
individuals tripled from 4 to 12 percentage points between 1989 and 2010 (Panel A of Figure 1.8).
Over time, young females in Russia become much more likely than males to receive higher edu-
cation. These changes provide motivation for the model which links together changes in the share
of male and female population with higher education in a labor market and male and female wages.
1.3 Econometric Framework
1.3.1 Theoretical Model
The goal of the theoretical model is to show how to identify education externalities by gender,
i.e., the effect of an increase in the relative supply of educated male and female workers in a
labor market on the wages of male and female workers with different levels of education. The
model predicts that when the relative supply of educated workers increases, wages of uneducated
workers benefit both from imperfect substitution and education externality, while the wages of
educated workers decrease because of the increased supply of educated workers but benefit from
the education externality.
Assume that a country consists of a number of geographic regions, which represent competitive
labor markets.7 Each labor market produces a single good y and employs educated and uneducated
male and female labor and capital. The production is represented by a Cobb-Douglas function8:
7Geographic regions are usually represented by cities(Ciccone and Peri (2006); Conley and Tsiang (2003); Moretti
(2004); Muravyev (2008); Rauch (1993); Sand (2013)), provinces (Bratti and Leombruni (2014)), or states (Acemoglu
and Angrist (2001); Ciccone and Peri (2006); Iranzo and Peri (2009); Lange and Topel (2006)).
8This form of the production function rules out substitutability between male and female workers in the production.
This assumption is valid if there is high degree of gender segregation across occupations and/or industries. In Russia,
women were highly concentrated in some industries, such as education (82% women, 18% men), healthcare (80%
women, 20% men), services (70% women, 30% men) in 2012, and not highly represented in other industries, such as
construction (15% women, 85% men) and transportation (27% women, 73% men). Compared to the U.S., Russian
occupational segregation across genders is higher, which motivates this form of the production function.
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wages are equal to the marginal product of labor.9
The wages of uneducated workers of gender g are equal to
logwg0 = logα0 + α0log(φ
g
0 + µ
g(
Lg1
Lg0 + L
g
1
)) + (α0 − 1)log(1− L
g
1
Lg0 + L
g
1
) (1.4)
+ α1log(φ
g
1 + µ
g(
Lg1
Lg0 + L
g
1
))(
Lg1
Lg0 + L
g
1
) + (1− α1 − α0)log( K
g
Lg0 + L
g
1
)
Wages of educated workers of gender g are equal to
logwg1 = α0log(φ
g
0 + µ
g L
g
1
Lg0 + L
g
1
)(1− L
g
1
Lg0 + L
g
1
) + logα1 + α1log(φ
g
1 + µ
g L
g
1
Lg0 + L1
) (1.5)
+ (α1 − 1)log( L
g
1
Lg0 + L
g
1
) + (1− α1 − α0)log( K
g
Lg0 + L
g
1
)
9Appendix 3 shows how wages are derived.
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Assuming the population size, Lg0 + L
g
1, stays constant (i.e., no demographic shocks), the effect of
changes in the share of educated workers of gender g can be derived by taking the derivative of
wages with respect to the share of educated workers of gender g:
∂log(wg0)
∂
Lg1
Lg0+L
g
1
=
α0µ
g
φg0 + µ
g(
Lg1
Lg0+L
g
1
)
+
1− α0
1− Lg1
Lg0+L
g
1
+
α1µ
g
φg1 + µ
g(
Lg1
Lg0+L
g
1
)
+
α1
Lg1
Lg0+L
g
1
(1.6)
∂log(wg1)
∂
Lg1
Lg0+L
g
1
=
α0µ
g
φg0 + µ
g(
Lg1
Lg0+L
g
1
)
− α0
1− Lg1
Lg0+L
g
1
+
α1µ
g
φg1 + µ
g(
Lg1
Lg0+L
g
1
)
+
α1 − 1
Lg1
Lg0+L
g
1
(1.7)
Equation (1.6) shows that when the share of male/female workers with higher education increases,
wages of uneducated male/female workers increase because 1) uneducated workers’ productivity
increases due to the imperfect substitution between workers with different levels of education
1− α0
1− Lg1
Lg0+L
g
1
+
α1
Lg1
Lg0+L
g
1
> 0
and 2) there is a positive externality from education
α0µ
g
φg0 + µ
g(
Lg1
Lg0+L
g
1
)
+
α1µ
g
φg1 + µ
g(
Lg1
Lg0+L
g
1
)
> 0
Equation (1.7) shows that the effect on wages of male/female workers with higher education de-
pends on two effects: 1) a supply effect, which moves the labor market along a downward sloping
demand curve
α1 − 1
Lg1
Lg0+L
g
1
− α0
1− Lg1
Lg0+L
g
1
< 0
and 2) an education externality effect
α0µ
g
φg0 + µ
g(
Lg1
Lg0+L
g
1
)
+
α1µ
g
φg1 + µ
g(
Lg1
Lg0+L
g
1
)
> 0
Hence, changes in the wages of educated male/female workers in response to an increase in the
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share of educated male/female workers depend on which of the two effects (supply effect or edu-
cation externality effect) is stronger.
1.3.2 Empirical Model
This section describes an empirical specification of the wage equation based on the theoreti-
cal model derived above and discusses problems associated with estimating education externality
effect. The wage of individual i of gender g living in region r in period t is equal to the market
equilibrium wage and is determined by an equation of the form
log(wgirt) = β
gXgit + ϕ
gSgrt + α
gZrt + γr + γt + u
g
irt, g = m, f (1.8)
whereXgit is a vector of individual characteristics; S
g
rt represents the percentage of college educated
workers of gender g in region r in year t; Zrt is a vector of characteristics of region r at time t which
may be correlated with Sgrt; γr represents region fixed effect; and γt is year effect. The error term,
ugirt, is the sum of three components:
ugirt = ν
g
rλ
g
ir + ξ
g
rt + η
g
irt (1.9)
where λgir is a permanent individual unobservable component (e.g., ability); ν
g
r is a factor loading
which represents the return to the unobserved component λgir in region r; ξ
g
rt represents time-
varying shocks to labor demand and supply in region r in period t; ηgirt is the transitory component
of log wages which is assumed to be independently and identically distributed over individuals,
regions and time.
When estimating the effect of changes in the share of workers with higher education, Sgrt, on the
wages of workers, an OLS estimate of the effect of share on wages, ϕˆg, is likely to be biased due
to the correlation between the share, Sgrt, and the error term, u
g
irt, i.e., corr(S
g
rt, u
g
irt) 6= 0. First,
the share of educated workers in the region could be correlated with the individual unobserved
component λgir, i.e., corr(S
g
rt, λ
g
ir) 6= 0. Second, the share of educated workers in the region could
be correlated with the time-varying demand or supply shocks, i.e., corr(Sgrt, ξ
g
rt) 6= 0. In this case,
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an OLS estimate ϕˆg is biased either downward or upward, depending on whether the variation in
the relative number of educated workers is driven by the unobserved supply or demand factors
(Moretti 2004). If the variation in college share across regions is driven by the supply factors,
the unobserved heterogeneity biases the OLS estimate downward. This may occur when some
unobserved characteristics of the region attract more educated workers to the area raising the share
of educated individuals (for example, geographic location, climate, amenities). To get a consistent
estimate of the education externality effect, a researcher needs an instrumental variable that is
uncorrelated with the region unobserved characteristics but correlates strongly with college share
in the region.
On the other hand, an upward bias in the OLS estimate, ϕˆg, of the education externality effect
arises from the heterogeneity in the demand for educated workers across regions. In this case, the
OLS coefficient in a regression of wages of educated workers on the share of educated workers
assigns all of the observed correlation between wages and the share of educated workers to educa-
tion externality and yields an estimate that is upward biased. An instrumental variable uncorrelated
with factors that affect the productivity of educated workers and, therefore, the demand for them
would generate a consistent estimate of education externality.
1.3.3 Identification
The main challenge associated with estimating education externalities is the endogeneity prob-
lem arising due to the correlation between the share of college educated workers in the region
and wages. Acemoglu and Angrist (2001) is one of the first studies that addresses the endogene-
ity problem by using differences in the compulsory schooling and child labor laws across U.S.
states as instruments for the average human capital in the labor market. However, the variation
in this instrument primarily affects secondary education while sizeable externalities may instead
be generated by college education.10 Therefore, recent studies shifted their focus to higher levels
of education such as college education. For example, Moretti (2004) uses the age structure of a
10For example, Rosenthal and Strange (2008) show that the benefits of spatial concentration are driven by proximity
to college educated workers.
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local labor market in the past and the presence of a land-grant college as the instruments for the
share of college graduates and finds sizeable human capital externalities of college education. Dias
and Tebaldi (2014) provide evidence that sector concentration of highly qualified workers (with
at least a college degree) generates knowledge externalities, i.e., workers learn from their peers.
To reconcile the mixed evidence on human capital externalities generated by high school and col-
lege education, Iranzo and Peri (2009) develop a model that predicts positive externalities from
increased college education and negligible external effects from high school education.
To identify human capital externalities by gender in Russia, this paper explores the supply of
higher education during the Soviet period. Specifically, the number of campuses of higher educa-
tion institutions in the region of residence twenty years before the wage data is observed is used as
an instrument for the current share of individuals with higher education in a region. A number of
reasons support the idea that the number of campuses in the past represents a valid instrument for
the contemporaneous share of population with higher education in a given labor market. First, a
higher number of campuses in a given location increases the local youths’ probability of receiving
higher education (Frenette (2009); Oppedisano (2011)). College graduates are also more likely
to stay and work in the location where they receive education (Bound and Turner (2004); Groen
(2004); Winters (2011)). Therefore, the presence and the number of campuses of higher educa-
tion institutions in the region of residence have a positive effect on the number and the share of
individuals with higher education in a given market. Second, the Soviet government regulated the
allocation of college campuses across the country based on the needs and political objectives of
planned economy. The goal of the central authorities was to allocate higher education institutions
over the vast territory of the country and ensure access to them. For example, there was one uni-
versity/institute of higher education per 110,000 individuals in Russian cities before the collapse
of the Soviet Union (Muravyev (2008)). The wages were also equalized across regions through
the so-called wage grid and the skill-biased migration was very low. Therefore, the allocation of
college campuses across regions during the Soviet period can be regarded as exogenous with re-
spect to the market-based wages prevailing during the transition (the 1990s) and market period (the
2000s). Location of college campuses determined by the Soviet government had little to do with
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the demand for skilled labor in the emerging market economy of the 1990s and the 2000s.
1.4 Data
The data for this study comes from the Russia Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (RLMS), a lon-
gitudinal survey of the population of Russia initiated in the early 1990s to measure the effect of the
market reforms on the economic well-being of the households and individuals.11 The distribution
of the initial sample of households by gender, age, and urban-rural location compared well with the
corresponding distribution of the Soviet Census 1989. In later years, the sample was replenished
to preserve the representativeness of the population of Russia. RLMS collects a rich set of infor-
mation on demographic characteristics, education, health, labor market outcomes, and community
characteristics, among many other. This chapter uses sixteen waves of RLMS spanning the period
from 1994 to 2011.12 The sample includes 22-59-year old men and 22-54-year old women.13 I
drop youths under the age of 22 because some of them may still be completing their education.
Using the Census data, I calculate the share of male and female population with higher educa-
tion to proxy for the share of workers with higher education, Sgrt.14 The Census data are disaggre-
gated by gender, geographic region, age (5-year groups), and the type of residence (urban/rural).15
The share of male/female population with higher education in a region, in a particular age group,
and in an urban/rural location is calculated as the number of males/females with complete higher
education divided by the total male/female population. This measure is then merged with the
RLMS based on the workers’ current region of residence, their age, and the type of location where
11RLMS is organized by the National Research University Higher School of Economics, Moscow together with the
Carolina Population Center at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill and the Institute of Sociology at the
Russian Academy of Sciences. See http://www.cpc.unc.edu/projects/rlms-hse/project/study for the description of the
study.
12RLMS was not conducted in 1997 and 1999.
13The official retirement age is 55 for women and 60 for men.
14The primary reason for this decision is a lack of data on the share of educated workers across regions and over
time. I assume linear growth and interpolate the share of population with higher education in years for which Census
data is not available.
15Age groups are 20-24, 25-29, 30-34, 35-39, 40-44, 45-49, 50-54, and 55-59. Urban locations include cities and
townships. Rural locations include villages.
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they live (urban/rural).
Labor market characteristics of regions such as the unemployment rate and the employment
by industry and gender come from the Russian Federal Statistical Services. These characteristics
are merged with the RLMS based on the respondent’s current region of residence and survey year.
They vary both across regions in a given year and over time due to the transition to the market
economy during the period of study. The transition was characterized by the changing industrial
structure and employment in different industries (Bank (2003), Bank (2005)). For example, the
share of employment in manufacturing declined from 27 percent in 1994 to 19 percent in 2011.
The share of employment in agriculture, construction, and transportation also declined. On the
other hand, the share of employment in trade and education increased over time.
The Russian University Database provides the number of campuses of higher education insti-
tutions during the Soviet period (Belskaya and Peter (2015)).16 This database contains detailed
information on more than 1,000 institutions of higher education in Russia. Table A.2 shows the
distribution of the number of campuses by year. The number of campuses varies considerably over
time and across regions. The mean number of campuses per region increased from 19 campuses in
1974 to 22 campuses in 1991. The standard deviation decreased in the 1970s but increased steadily
until the 1980s and declined again in the late 1980s.
Table A.3 presents the descriptive statistics of three samples used in the empirical analysis:
workers of all levels of education, workers with some higher education or more (college dropouts,
college graduates, and postgraduate graduates), and workers with less than higher education (sec-
ondary school dropouts, secondary school graduates, and specialized secondary education gradu-
ates). There are 40,121 male individuals in the sample and 40,660 female individuals. Columns 1
and 2 of Table A.3 present descriptive statistics of the samples of male and female workers. There
is a 0.24 log points difference in hourly wages between male and female workers. Average work
experience of male workers exceeds the experience of female workers by one year. On the other
hand, female workers have 0.75 more years of education and the share of female population with
16This dataset is constructed based on the university websites and the Federal Portal “Russian Education”
(www.edu.ru).
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higher education in a local labor market exceeds the share of male population by 0.06 percentage
points. Columns 3 and 4 present descriptive statistics for the sample of educated workers. There
is a 0.15 log points difference in hourly wages, female college graduates have 0.14 more years of
education compared to male college graduates, and the share of educated females exceeds the share
of educated males by 0.05 percentage points. Columns 5 and 6 present descriptive statistics for the
sample of workers without college education. The sample of less educated workers differs from
the sample of educated workers in many respects. First, the gender wage gap of 0.36 log points
is more than double than the gender wage gap between educated workers. Second, less educated
females have 0.48 more years of education than less educated males, which is a three times larger
gap compared to the gender gap in education among educated workers.
1.5 Results
1.5.1 Social Returns to Education
This section presents the estimates of the social returns to education for male and female work-
ers as well as the changes in the social returns from mid-1990s to late 2000s. I estimate equation
(1.8) by gender and report the results in Table A.4. Individual characteristics Xgirt include years of
education, work experience, and work experience squared. To correct for selection into the labor
market, I estimate an inverse propensity weight from the probit model of non-missing wages on
individual characteristics and dummies for being married and having children under the age of
seven. I use the inverse of the estimated weight in all models. Columns 1 and 2 of Table A.4 show
that there is a 2.819 percent increase in wages of male workers and a 2.331 percent increase in
wages of female workers in response to a one-percentage point increase in the share of male and
female population with higher education. The estimates also suggest that private return to one year
of education for female workers exceeds that for male workers throughout the period. Another
interesting finding is positive and significant returns to work experience for female workers and
negative returns for male workers.
Columns 3 and 4 provide the estimates of the model that controls for the regional unemploy-
ment rate which proxies for the time-varying labor demand shocks. The estimates of the social
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returns to education decrease which implies that labor demand shocks matter. In columns 5 and 6,
I include regional unemployment rate and an additional control for the labor demand shifts for male
versus female labor across industries. Following Katz and Murphy (1992), shifts for male versus
female labor across industries are predicted by the nationwide employment growth in industries,
weighted by the changes in the region-specific employment share of male and female workers in
those industries:
shockgrt =
8∑
i=1
κirt4Egi (1.10)
where i indexes industry; shockgrt represent the predicted employment change for workers of
gender g in region r at time t; κirt is the share of total employment in industry i in region r at time
t;4Egi is the change in the log of employment in the same industry nationally between 1994 and t
by workers of gender g.17 The inclusion of the index lowers the estimates to 2.240 percent for male
and 1.806 percent for female workers. The fact that Katz-Murphy index changes the estimates of
the external returns to education further supports the idea that the demand shocks may introduce
the bias. Therefore, it is important to control for them. Finally, to control for the unobserved
permanent region-specific characteristics, I estimate equation (1.8) with the region fixed effects in
column 7 and 8. Controlling for the heterogeneity across regions lowers the external returns to
education to 1.705 percent for male and 0.951 percent for female workers but the estimates remain
statistically significant.
Given that the share of educated individuals grew over time, I estimate changes in the social
returns to education by year. Column 1 of Table 2.5 suggests that the returns to college share for
male workers increased from 3.250 percent in 1994 to 3.974 percent in 2000 and decreased there-
after, reaching a minimum of 1.909 percent in 2011. The returns for female workers followed a
similar pattern. Accounting for the heterogeneity across regions in columns 3 and 4 reveals a sim-
ilar time trend, however, the returns become lower. The finding that the estimates of social returns
from using single cross-sections are considerably larger than the estimates that control for region
17Classification of industries is presented in Appendix A.
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fixed effects suggests that at least part of the relationship between the share of educated individu-
als and wages is due to omitted labor markets characteristics. A decline in the external returns to
education in the 2000s coincided with an increase in the supply of college-educated workers who
entered colleges during the expansion in the 1990s and started to join the labor force in the early
2000s. This finding parallels Sand (2013), who finds declining external returns to education in the
U.S. between 1980s and 1990s. It is possible that an increase in the education level of population
in a country with high level of educational attainment (such as Russia and the U.S.) decreases the
external returns to education. Overall, the analysis in this subsection shows the existence of cor-
relations between the main variable of interest, the share of male/female population with higher
education, and wages of male and female workers.
1.5.2 External Returns to Education by Education Group
The model presented in Section 3 shows that the external returns to education represent a sum
of the imperfect substitution effect and the spillover effect. To identify education externalities, the
model needs to be estimated separately for workers with different levels of education. This section
presents the estimates the effect of changes in the share of educated males and females on wages
of workers with different levels of education.
Panel A of Table 2.6 reports the estimates of equation (1.8) for the sample of male and female
workers with higher education. The coefficient on the share of population with higher education
is found to be positive for skilled workers, implying that the positive education externality ef-
fect exceeds the negative supply effect. There is a 2.255 percent increase in wages of educated
male workers and a 1.8 percent increase in wages of educated female workers in response to a
one-percentage point increase in the share of male and female population with higher education.
Accounting for local demand shifts and regional heterogeneity in column 7 and 8 lowers the esti-
mates to 0.726 percent for educated males and 0.54 percent for educated females but does not alter
the sign and statistical significance of the estimates. In Panel B of Table 2.6, I estimate equation
(1.8) for a sample of workers with less than higher education. The estimates support the prediction
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of the theoretical model that the external return associated with an increase in college share is pos-
itive for the unskilled workers. Compared to Panel A, the estimates are higher due to the positive
supply effect as indicated by the theoretical model.18
1.5.3 Instrumental Variable Estimates
The primary concern associated with estimating education externalities is that the share of
educated individuals in the labor market is endogenous. To address the endogeneity concern, I
estimate the model using the instrumental variable method. I use the number of college campuses
in the region of residence in the past to instrument the contemporaneous share of college educated
male and female workers. The results are reported in Table 2.7. The first stage results show that
the number of college campuses has a strong and significant effect on the share of individuals with
higher education. Compared to OLS estimates presented in Table 2.6, IV estimates are somewhat
larger which suggests the presence of a downward bias in the OLS estimates due to the unobserved
supply factors driving the variation in the share of educated individuals across labor markets. A
one percentage point increase in the share of educated male population implies a 3.005 percent
increase in male wages (Column 1). A similar increase in educated female population leads to a
3.478 percent increase in female wages. Controlling for the unobserved demand shocks using local
unemployment and Katz-Murphy index lowers these effects to 2.045 percent for male workers and
3.647 percent for female workers (Column 5 and 6). Thus, the yearly increase in the share of
male population with higher education of 0.76 percentage points observed in Russia between 2002
and 2010 implies an increase of 1.5 percent in male wages. An increase in the share of educated
females of 1.06 percentage points per year observed in Russia between 2002 and 2010 implies
a 3.86 percent increase in female wages. A higher increase in female wages during the period
of study implies that education externalities contributed to the narrowing of the gender wage gap
among educated workers in Russia.
18In Table A3, I estimate equation (1.8) by education level of the workers controlling for the share of male and
female workers with higher education together. The estimates suggest that the share of educated male workers has an
effect on both male and female workers but the effect on female workers becomes zero when I account for regional
heterogeneity.
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In columns 7 and 8, I estimate a model that controls for the unobserved heterogeneity across
labor markets. The interpretation of the estimates in this specification changes as the main vari-
ation in the instrument comes from changes in the number of campuses in a given location over
time. Therefore, the estimates of 7 percent for male workers and 6 percent for female workers are
interpreted as a Local Average Treatment Effect (Imbens and Angrist, 1994).
Panel B of Table 2.7 reports the estimates for a sample of uneducated workers. The IV esti-
mates of education externalities in a model that controls for the labor demand shocks suggest a
2.380 percent increase in male and a 3.491 percent increase in female wages in response to a one
percentage point increase in the share of educated male and female workers, respectively. Given
the annual growth of the share of educated male population by 0.76 percentage points and educated
female population by 1.06 percentage points, wages of unskilled male workers increased by 1.8
percent and wages of unskilled female workers increased by 3.7 percent. Compared to the wage
increase among educated workers due to the growth in the share of educated male and female pop-
ulation, the gender wage gap among unskilled individuals decreased at a slower pace.
1.5.4 Robustness Checks
Table 2.8 presents estimation results of the alternative specifications. In Column 1 and 2, I
exclude the period of the transition to a market economy and estimate the model limiting the time
period to 2000-2011. The estimates of education externality for both male and female workers
increase compared to the baseline (Column 5 and 6 of Table 2.7), which implies that the labor mar-
kets become more responsive to changes in the educational composition of the labor force com-
pared to the transition economy. In Column 3 and 4, I report the estimates when two largest cities,
Moscow and St.Petersburg, are excluded from the sample. These cities differ from the remaining
regions in terms of educational attainment of the labor force, the number of college campuses, and
labor market characteristics. The estimates of education externalities decrease quite significantly
highlighting the fact that externalities are probably higher in larger labor markets or markets with
high level of educational attainment. In Column 5 and 6, I restrict the sample to individuas who
are 25-34-year old as they represent the group with the largest gender education gap in favor of
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females. Finally, in Column 7 and 8, I estimate the model using the sample of individuals older
than 35. Compared to the baseline estimate of of education externality of 2.045 percent, younger
male workers experience a 2.425 percent increase in their wages when the share of educated male
workers increases by one percent. On the other hand, the wages of older male workers would only
increase by 1.613 percent in response to such a change. The estimates of education externalities
for female workers are also significantly higher for younger females, 4.290 percent compared to
2.952 percent for females older than 35. Overal, Table 2.8 shows that educated female workers
younger than 35 working in urban areas receive the largest gains from education externalities.
1.6 Conclusion
This chapter documents the reversal of the gender gap in tertiary education around the world
and establishes a causal relationship between the changes in the share of educated male and female
population and the gender wage gap through education externalities. In light of the growing female
college participation, the analysis of this chapter becomes important for policy makers around
the world because an increasing number of educated women will be joining the labor force in
the nearest future. Empirical analysis relies on the case of Russia, one of the largest developing
countries, which experienced a reversal of the gender gap in higher education over a decade ago.
To account for the possibility of the region-wide labor demand shocks that increase wages in a
region and attract more educated workers, I estimate these shocks with an index of demand shifts
and by the instrumental variable technique. The results suggest that the growth in the share of
educated male and female population similar to the one observed between 2002 and 2010 caused
the wages of educated male and female workers to grow by 1.5 and 3.86 percent, respectively.
Wages of unskilled male and female workers increased by 1.8 and 3.7 percent. Together these
changes contributed to the narrowing of the gender wage gap over time
This chapter uncovers the impact of the growing female participation in higher education on
the gender wage gap through one channel, namely, education externalities. Other channels can be
important as well and evaluation of the impact of other channels as well as the improvements in
female health, childbirth, and family formation represent important directions for future empirical
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research in this area.
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Table 1.1: Population with Higher Education by Census Year
Mean Variance P75-P25 P90-P10
Males with Higher Education
1989 10.2 0.1 2.8 5.8
2002 13.7 0.1 2.3 5.7
2010 18.9 0.2 3.6 7.3
Females with Higher Education
1989 9.8 0.07 2.1 4.9
2002 14.8 0.09 2.2 5.1
2010 22.7 0.1 3.7 7.7
Note: Sample includes 78 regions and 2 federal cities - Moscow and St. Petersburg.
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Table 1.2: Number of Campuses of Higher Education Institutions, 1974-1991
Men Women
Mean St. Dev. Min Max N Mean St. Dev. Min Max N
1974 19.00 22.54 0 91 2,012 19.65 23.01 0 91 1,774
1975 17.88 21.17 0 92 1,849 18.70 21.84 0 92 1,658
1976 18.09 21.56 0 92 1,771 18.24 21.55 0 92 1,657
1978 17.43 19.79 0 93 1,792 17.35 19.38 0 93 1,835
1980 15.43 16.05 0 93 1,898 16.21 17.03 0 93 1,964
1981 21.43 24.63 0 93 2,101 21.75 24.55 0 93 2,213
1982 22.30 25.97 0 93 2,201 22.89 26.05 0 93 2,358
1983 22.26 25.65 0 93 2,263 21.78 24.95 0 93 2,406
1984 23.07 26.25 0 93 2,328 22.22 25.21 0 93 2,413
1985 22.71 25.83 0 93 2,270 21.27 24.45 0 93 2,302
1986 21.79 25.20 0 94 2,817 21.81 25.37 0 94 2,918
1987 21.45 25.07 0 95 2,869 20.93 24.35 0 95 2,901
1988 21.35 24.84 0 97 2,762 21.43 24.98 0 97 2,867
1989 21.38 24.98 0 96 2,704 20.81 24.30 0 96 2,833
1990 20.77 24.72 0 100 4,230 20.50 24.35 0 100 4,301
1991 22.19 28.40 1 117 4,254 22.53 28.74 1 117 4,260
Note: years 1977 and 1979 are not listed because RLMS was not conducted in 1997 and 1999.
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Table 1.3: Summary Statistics, RLMS 1994-2011
All education levels Some college or more Less than college
Men Women Men Women Men Women
Individual-level variables
Log hourly wage 3.17 2.93 3.59 3.44 3.03 2.67
(1.43) (1.40) (1.36) (1.30) (1.42) (1.39)
Education 12.37 13.12 15.83 15.97 11.22 11.70
(2.78) (2.71) (2.10) (1.96) (1.88) (1.75)
Experience 20.03 18.94 16.03 14.84 21.36 20.97
(11.03) (10.04) (10.60) (9.64) (10.84) (9.61)
Married 0.72 0.59 0.74 0.59 0.71 0.60
(0.44) (0.49) (0.43) (0.49) (0.45) (0.48)
Children younger than 7 0.37 0.32 0.37 0.32 0.38 0.32
(0.60) (0.55) (0.58) (0.54) (0.61) (0.55)
Region-level variables
Share of college graduates 0.21 0.27 0.25 0.30 0.20 0.25
(0.09) (0.10) (0.09) (0.11) (0.09) (0.10)
Unemployment rate 7.71 7.73 7.18 7.29 7.89 7.96
(3.37) (3.40) (3.48) (3.48) (3.31) (3.33)
N 40,121 40,660 10,047 13,479 30,074 27,181
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Table 1.4: Estimates of the Education Externalities by Gender
Men Women Men Women Men Women Men Women
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
College share 2.819*** 2.331*** 2.462*** 1.938*** 2.240*** 1.806*** 1.705*** 0.951***
(0.108) (0.119) (0.097) (0.080) (0.112) (0.088) (0.105) (0.077)
Educ*94 0.041*** 0.067*** 0.045*** 0.068*** - - - -
(0.015) (0.019) (0.015) (0.020) - - - -
Educ*95 0.045*** 0.084*** 0.046*** 0.084*** - - - -
(0.007) (0.008) (0.006) (0.008) - - - -
Educ*96 0.053*** 0.082*** 0.053*** 0.082*** 0.052*** 0.081*** 0.046*** 0.072***
(0.011) (0.007) (0.011) (0.007) (0.012) (0.007) (0.010) (0.007)
Educ*98 0.062*** 0.092*** 0.061*** 0.092*** 0.065*** 0.092*** 0.054*** 0.086***
(0.008) (0.013) (0.008) (0.013) (0.008) (0.013) (0.006) (0.012)
Educ*00 0.068*** 0.104*** 0.070*** 0.106*** 0.071*** 0.107*** 0.063*** 0.101***
(0.009) (0.011) (0.009) (0.011) (0.022) (0.011) (0.007) (0.009)
Educ*01 0.047*** 0.090*** 0.046*** 0.088*** 0.048*** 0.090*** 0.045*** 0.084***
(0.009) (0.011) (0.009) (0.011) (0.009) (0.012) (0.006) (0.012)
Educ*02 0.046*** 0.081*** 0.046*** 0.081*** 0.046*** 0.081*** 0.044*** 0.081***
(0.008) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.011) (0.006) (0.011)
Educ*03 0.050*** 0.097*** 0.049*** 0.097*** 0.050*** 0.097*** 0.047*** 0.093***
(0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.008) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006)
Educ*04 0.049*** 0.101*** 0.050*** 0.101*** 0.052*** 0.101*** 0.046*** 0.096***
(0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.009) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Educ*05 0.047*** 0.087*** 0.048*** 0.085*** 0.050*** 0.086*** 0.045*** 0.081***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.006) (0.008)
Educ*06 0.052*** 0.087*** 0.052*** 0.087*** 0.048*** 0.084*** 0.049*** 0.078***
(0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.006) (0.006)
Educ*07 0.050*** 0.084*** 0.051*** 0.085*** 0.044*** 0.083*** 0.043*** 0.080***
(0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.005) (0.007)
Educ*08 0.051*** 0.070*** 0.052*** 0.071*** 0.051*** 0.071*** 0.048*** 0.065***
(0.006) (0.008) (0.005) (0.008) (0.005) (0.008) (0.005) (0.007)
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Men Women Men Women Men Women Men Women
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Educ*09 0.042*** 0.074*** 0.042*** 0.075*** 0.043*** 0.074*** 0.041*** 0.069***
(0.004) (0.007) (0.004) (0.007) (0.004) (0.007) (0.004) (0.005)
Educ*10 0.049*** 0.067*** 0.050*** 0.067*** 0.050*** 0.066*** 0.046*** 0.063***
(0.004) (0.005) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003)
Educ*11 0.050*** 0.072*** 0.052*** 0.073*** 0.053*** 0.074*** 0.048*** 0.070***
(0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.003) (0.004)
Exp*94 -0.005*** 0.006** -0.005*** 0.005** - - - -
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) - - - -
Exp*95 -0.001 0.008*** -0.001 0.007*** - - - -
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) - - - -
Exp*96 -0.004 0.009*** -0.004 0.008*** -0.003 0.008*** -0.003 0.006***
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Exp*98 -0.001 0.010*** -0.001 0.009*** -0.001 0.009*** 0.000 0.008***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
Exp*00 -0.002 0.013*** -0.002 0.012*** -0.002 0.012*** -0.001 0.012***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Exp*01 -0.006*** 0.009*** -0.006*** 0.008*** -0.005*** 0.008*** -0.004*** 0.009***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Exp*02 -0.008*** 0.007*** -0.007*** 0.008*** -0.007*** 0.008*** -0.005*** 0.009***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Exp*03 -0.009*** 0.007*** -0.008*** 0.007*** -0.008*** 0.007*** -0.006*** 0.008***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Exp*04 -0.008*** 0.008*** -0.007*** 0.008*** -0.007*** 0.008*** -0.005*** 0.008***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
Exp*05 -0.008*** 0.007*** -0.007*** 0.006*** -0.007*** 0.006*** -0.005*** 0.006***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
Exp*06 -0.006*** 0.007*** -0.005*** 0.006*** -0.005*** 0.006*** -0.004*** 0.004***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Exp*07 -0.004*** 0.009*** -0.004*** 0.008*** -0.005*** 0.007*** -0.004*** 0.006***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Exp*08 -0.003*** 0.009*** -0.003*** 0.008*** -0.003*** 0.008*** -0.002** 0.005***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
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Men Women Men Women Men Women Men Women
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Exp*09 -0.001 0.012*** -0.001 0.010*** -0.001 0.010*** -0.001 0.008***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Exp*10 -0.001 0.012*** -0.001 0.011*** -0.001 0.010*** -0.000 0.008***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Exp*11 -0.001 0.011*** -0.001 0.010*** -0.001 0.010*** -0.000 0.008***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Cons -0.510*** -1.217*** -0.265 -0.887*** 0.370* -0.095 0.153 -0.424***
(0.172) (0.190) (0.180) (0.205) (0.219) (0.165) (0.171) (0.136)
R2 0.78 0.78 0.78 0.78 0.72 0.72 0.76 0.77
N 40,121 40,660 40,121 40,660 35,831 36,889 35,831 36,889
Unemployment Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Katz-Murphy index Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region FE Yes Yes
Notes: Dependent variable is log hourly wage. All specifications include year fixed effect. Standard errors, clustered
by region and year, are reported in parentheses. The inverse propensity weight from the probit model of non-missing
wages is applied in all models. Asterisks denote significance levels: 1 percent (***), 5 percent (**), and 10 percent
(*).
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Table 1.5: Cross-Sectional Estimates of External Returns by Gender
1994 1995
OLS FE OLS FE
Men Women Men Women Men Women Men Women
College share 3.250*** 3.072*** 3.260*** 2.156** 3.352*** 2.821*** 3.604*** 1.431*
(0.452) (0.373) (0.737) (0.881) (0.466) (0.457) (0.733) (0.805)
R2 0.11 0.08 0.27 0.22 0.14 0.13 0.30 0.27
N 2,012 1,774 2,012 1,774 1,849 1,658 1,849 1,658
1996 1998
OLS FE OLS FE
Men Women Men Women Men Women Men Women
College share 2.413*** 2.885*** 2.231** 2.247*** 3.233*** 2.612*** 3.502*** 1.618***
(0.531) (0.470) (0.832) (0.607) (0.561) (0.441) (0.600) (0.505)
R2 0.14 0.14 0.33 0.31 0.18 0.17 0.43 0.34
N 1,771 1,657 1,771 1,657 1,792 1,835 1,792 1,835
2000 2001
OLS FE OLS FE
Men Women Men Women Men Women Men Women
College share 3.974*** 3.185*** 3.134*** 2.049*** 3.789*** 3.303*** 2.944*** 1.850***
(0.714) (0.406) (0.557) (0.568) (0.583) (0.451) (0.418) (0.475)
R2 0.19 0.18 0.40 0.34 0.19 0.21 0.40 0.38
N 1,898 1,964 1,898 1,964 2,101 2,213 2,101 2,213
2002 2003
OLS FE OLS FE
Men Women Men Women Men Women Men Women
College share 3.533*** 2.727*** 2.311*** 0.731* 3.620*** 3.071*** 2.014*** 0.993**
(0.558) (0.443) (0.469) (0.404) (0.470) (0.475) (0.617) (0.382)
R2 0.27 0.19 0.45 0.35 0.24 0.24 0.38 0.36
N 2,201 2,358 2,201 2,358 2,263 2,406 2,263 2,406
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2004 2005
OLS FE OLS FE
Men Women Men Women Men Women Men Women
College share 3.509*** 3.008*** 2.183*** 1.018** 3.405*** 2.880*** 2.342*** 1.213**
(0.477) (0.410) (0.629) (0.400) (0.427) (0.404) (0.473) (0.539)
R2 0.30 0.26 0.41 0.37 0.24 0.23 0.39 0.35
N 2,328 2,413 2,328 2,413 2,270 2,302 2,270 2,302
2006 2007
OLS FE OLS FE
Men Women Men Women Men Women Men Women
College share 2.949*** 2.791*** 1.882*** 1.166*** 2.715*** 2.615*** 1.770*** 1.250***
(0.426) (0.477) (0.448) (0.284) (0.331) (0.479) (0.362) (0.316)
R2 0.24 0.23 0.37 0.35 0.24 0.25 0.37 0.38
N 2,817 2,918 2,817 2,918 2,869 2,901 2,869 2,901
2008 2009
OLS FE OLS FE
Men Women Men Women Men Women Men Women
College share 2.635*** 2.477*** 1.355*** 0.898** 2.335*** 1.751*** 0.984*** 0.436**
(0.382) (0.468) (0.382) (0.332) (0.363) (0.413) (0.272) (0.169)
R2 0.27 0.22 0.40 0.37 0.24 0.21 0.38 0.37
N 2,762 2,867 2,762 2,867 2,704 2,833 2,704 2,833
2010 2011
OLS FE OLS FE
Men Women Men Women Men Women Men Women
College share 2.101*** 1.498*** 0.803*** 0.239 1.909*** 1.557*** 0.709*** 0.452***
(0.364) (0.412) (0.199) (0.166) (0.376) (0.421) (0.223) (0.139)
R2 0.24 0.19 0.37 0.37 0.23 0.19 0.37 0.36
N 4,230 4,301 4,230 4,301 4,254 4,260 4,254 4,260
Notes: Dependent variable is log hourly wage. Standard errors, clustered by region, are reported in parentheses. The
inverse propensity weight from the probit model of non-missing wages is applied in all models. Asterisks denote
significance levels: 1 percent (***), 5 percent (**), and 10 percent (*).
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Table 1.6: Estimates of Education Externalities by Education Group
Men Women Men Women Men Women Men Women
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
A. Some college or more
College share 2.255*** 1.800*** 1.639*** 1.349*** 1.382*** 1.186*** 0.726*** 0.540***
(0.122) (0.158) (0.110) (0.104) (0.132) (0.125) (0.145) (0.095)
Education 0.025*** 0.016*** 0.025*** 0.015*** 0.022*** 0.015*** 0.014*** 0.008**
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
Experience 0.018*** 0.024*** 0.021*** 0.027*** 0.022*** 0.028*** 0.028*** 0.032***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Experience -0.054*** -0.039*** -0.060*** -0.051*** -0.065*** -0.057*** -0.076*** -0.073***
squared/100 (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.006) (0.006)
Constant -0.252*** -0.543*** 0.172*** -0.157 1.444*** 1.031*** 1.003*** 0.855***
(0.079) (0.086) (0.095) (0.109) (0.122) (0.121) (0.117) (0.094)
R2 0.78 0.76 0.79 0.76 0.71 0.69 0.75 0.74
N 10,047 13,479 10,047 13,479 9,126 12,511 9,126 12,511
B. Less than college
College share 2.903*** 2.450*** 2.563*** 2.049*** 2.343*** 1.934*** 1.569*** 0.892***
(0.117) (0.119) (0.112) (0.086) (0.128) (0.093) (0.126) (0.098)
Education 0.042*** 0.060*** 0.042*** 0.061*** 0.046*** 0.060*** 0.035*** 0.058***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
Experience 0.002 0.008*** 0.004* 0.010*** 0.006*** 0.010*** 0.009*** 0.019***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
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Men Women Men Women Men Women Men Women
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Experience -0.019*** 0.001 -0.022*** -0.006 -0.027*** -0.006 -0.031*** -0.033***
squared/100 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006)
Constant -0.634*** -1.372*** -0.374*** -1.011*** 2.504*** 0.217* 2.168*** 2.334***
(0.084) (0.079) (0.104) (0.100) (0.106) (0.115) (0.083) (0.074)
R2 0.78 0.78 0.78 0.78 0.72 0.72 0.78 0.77
N 30,074 27,181 30,074 27,181 26,705 24,378 26,705 24,378
Unemployment Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
KM index Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region FE Yes Yes
Notes: All specifications include year fixed effect. Standard errors, clustered by region and year, are reported in
parentheses. The inverse propensity weight from the probit model of non-missing wages is applied in all models.
Asterisks denote significance levels: 1 percent (***), 5 percent (**), and 10 percent (*).
32
Table 1.7: Instrumental Variable Estimates by Gender and Education Group
Men Women Men Women Men Women Men Women
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
A. Some college or more
First stage
Number of 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.001*** 0.002*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001***
campuses (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
F test 978.47 1207.06 942.89 1163.26 917.40 1158.22 737.95 735.05
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Second stage
College share 3.005*** 3.478*** 2.306*** 3.490*** 2.045*** 3.647*** 7.426*** 6.338***
(0.097) (0.093) (0.142) (0.138) (0.173) (0.164) (2.817) (2.253)
Education 0.016*** 0.011*** 0.018*** 0.011*** 0.016*** 0.011*** -0.011 0.002
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.010) (0.004)
Experience 0.015*** 0.016*** 0.018*** 0.016*** 0.019*** 0.013*** -0.003 -0.007
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.012) (0.015)
Experience -0.046*** -0.002 -0.052*** -0.002 -0.057*** 0.008 0.003 0.093
squared/100 (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.008) (0.032) (0.064)
N 10,047 13,479 10,047 13,479 9,126 12,511 9,126 12,511
Unemployment Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
KM index Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region FE Yes Yes
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Men Women Men Women Men Women Men Women
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
B. Less than college
First stage
Number of 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.001*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.001***
campuses (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
F test 2026.59 2094.40 1950.04 2022.70 1904.66 1925.15 2195.73 1333.05
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Second stage
College share 3.388*** 3.842*** 2.733*** 3.276*** 2.380*** 3.491*** -1.050 0.695
(0.059) (0.069) (0.080) (0.089) (0.091) (0.108) (0.679) (1.203)
Education 0.034*** 0.056*** 0.038*** 0.057*** 0.040*** 0.055*** 0.044*** 0.058***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
Experience 0.001 0.000 0.003 0.003* 0.006*** 0.001 0.023*** 0.019***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.007)
Experience -0.014*** 0.027*** -0.021*** 0.016*** -0.025*** 0.025*** -0.058*** -0.033
squared/100 (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.005) (0.006) (0.024)
N 30,074 27,181 30,074 27,181 26,705 24,378 26,705 24,378
Unempoyment Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
KM index Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region FE Yes Yes
Notes: All specifications include year fixed effect. The inverse propensity weight from the probit model of
non-missing wages is applied in all models. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Asterisks denote
significance levels: 1 percent (***), 5 percent (**), and 10 percent (*).
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Table 1.8: Robustness Checks for the Baseline IV Specification
Men Women Men Women Men Women Men Women
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
A. Some college or more
First stage
Number of 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.001*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002***
campuses (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
F test 924.10 1168.82 135.50 351.45 374.34 484.05 1300.10 2513.49
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Second stage
College share 2.132*** 3.768*** 1.066*** 1.950*** 2.425*** 4.290*** 1.613*** 2.952***
(0.182) (0.168) (0.331) (0.321) (0.306) (0.333) (0.208) (0.173)
Education 0.018*** 0.013*** 0.017*** 0.016*** 0.015** 0.013* 0.018*** 0.025***
(0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.007) (0.007) (0.005) (.004)
Experience 0.020*** 0.011*** 0.025*** 0.027*** 0.014 0.017 0.036*** 0.014
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.013) (0.013) (0.008) (0.008)
Experience -0.058*** 0.016* -0.071*** -0.043*** -0.048 0.042 -0.094*** -0.009
squared/100 (0.006) (0.008) (0.007) (0.010) (0.088) (0.093) (0.017) (0.019)
N 8,326 11,599 7,481 10,570 3,316 4,373 5,031 6,894
Unemployment Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
KM index Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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B. Less than college
First stage
Number of 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.001*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.001***
campuses (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
F test 2026.59 2094.40 1950.04 2022.70 1904.66 1925.15 2195.73 1333.05
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Second stage
College share 3.388*** 3.842*** 2.733*** 3.276*** 2.380*** 3.491*** -1.050 0.695
(0.059) (0.069) (0.080) (0.089) (0.091) (0.108) (0.679) (1.203)
Education 0.034*** 0.056*** 0.038*** 0.057*** 0.040*** 0.055*** 0.044*** 0.058***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
Experience 0.001 0.000 0.003 0.003* 0.006*** 0.001 0.023*** 0.019***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.007)
Experience -0.014*** 0.027*** -0.021*** 0.016*** -0.025*** 0.025*** -0.058*** -0.033
squared/100 (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.005) (0.006) (0.024)
N 30,074 27,181 30,074 27,181 26,705 24,378 26,705 24,378
Unempoyment Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
KM index Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: All specifications include year fixed effect. The inverse propensity weight from the probit model of
non-missing wages is applied in all models. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Asterisks denote
significance levels: 1 percent (***), 5 percent (**), and 10 percent (*).
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Figure 1.1: Female College Participation, Population with Higher Education
Notes: Panel A depicts the total number of male and female students enrolled in public and private higher education
institutions in Russia in a given year. Panel B shows the share of male and female students in the total number of
students enrolled in public and private higher education institutions in Russia. Panel C shows the share of Russian
male and female population with complete higher education or higher level of education (Postgraduate degree;
individuals are 15 years old and over). Panel D shows the share of the U.S. male and female population with a
Bachelor’s degree or higher (Master’s, Professional, or Doctoral degree; individuals are 15 years old and over).
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Figure 1.2: Gender Gap in Tertiary Education: World Regions
Notes: This figure displays the gender gap in tertiary education (ISCED 5 and 6) for 25-34-year old individuals across
the world regions. The gender gap in tertiary education is the difference between the share of men with complete
tertiary education and the share of women with complete tertiary education. Panel A shows the world’s average trend
in the gender gap in tertiary education from 1970 to 2010. Panel B shows the evolution of the gender gap in European
Union and Eastern and Central Asia. Panel C shows the evolution of the gender gap in East Asia and Pacific and
South Asia. Panel D shows the evolution of the gender gap in Middle East and North Africa and Latin America and
Caribbean. Tertiary education includes both higher education institutions such as universities and post-secondary
schools such as community colleges in U.S. The sample includes 146 countries. Data are taken from the World Bank
Education Statistics, which combine data collected by Barro and Lee (2013) and IIASA/VID (International Institute
for Applied Systems Analysis/Vienna Institute of Demography). Barro and Lee (2013) data set provides educational
attainment data for 173 countries in 5-year intervals from 1970 to 1995 and 1-year intervals from 1995 to 2010.
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Figure 1.3: Gender Gap in Tertiary Education: Developed Countries
Notes: This figure displays the gender gap in tertiary education (ISCED 5 and 6) for 25-34-year old individuals in
selected developed countries. The gender gap in tertiary education is the difference between the share of men with
complete tertiary education and the share of women with complete tertiary education. Panel A shows the evolution of
the gender gap in France and Germany. Panel B shows the evolution of the gender gap in Italy and Japan. Panel C
shows the evolution of the gender gap in the UK and US. Tertiary education includes both higher education
institutions such as universities and post-secondary schools such as community colleges in U.S.
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Figure 1.4: Gender Gap in Tertiary Education: Developing Countries
Notes: This figure displays the gender gap in tertiary education (ISCED 5 and 6) for 25-34-year old individuals in
four largest developing countries, Brazil, China, India, and Russia (BRIC). The gender gap in tertiary education is the
difference between the share of men with complete tertiary education and the share of women with complete tertiary
education. Tertiary education includes both higher education institutions such as universities and post-secondary
schools such as secondary professional schools (technicums) in Russia.
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Figure 1.5: Changes in the College Share of Male and Female Population
Notes: Panel A plots the relationship between the share of men with higher education in 1989 (on the X-axis) and the
share of men with higher education in 2002 (on the Y-axis). Also plotted is the 45-degree line. Panel B plots the
relationship between the share of women with higher education in 1989 (on the X-axis) and the share of women with
higher education in 2002 (on the Y-axis). Also plotted is the 45-degree line. Panel C plots the relationship between
the share of men with higher education in 2002 (on the X-axis) and the share of men with higher education in 2010
(on the Y-axis). Also plotted is the 45-degree line. Panel D plots the relationship between the share of women with
higher education in 2002 (on the X-axis) and the share of women with higher education in 2010 (on the Y-axis). Also
plotted is the 45-degree line. The share with higher education is calculated as population over 15 with complete
higher education (including postsecondary education) over the total population over 15. Sample includes 78 regions
and 2 federal cities, Moscow and St. Petersburg.
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Figure 1.6: Changes in the College Share of Male and Female Population
Notes: Panel A plots the relationship between the share of men with higher education in 1989 (on the X-axis) and the
change in the share of men with higher education between 1989 and 2002 (on the Y-axis). The slope (standard error)
of the OLS fitted line is -0.148(0.051). Panel B plots the relationship between the share of women with higher
education in 1989 (on the X-axis) and the change in the share of women with higher education between 1989 and
2002 (on the Y-axis). The slope (standard error) of the OLS fitted line is 0.022(0.054). Panel C plots the relationship
between the share of men with higher education in 2002 (on the X-axis) and the change in the share of men with
higher education between 2002 and 2010 (on the Y-axis). The slope (standard error) of the OLS fitted line is
0.359(0.032). Panel D plots the relationship between the share of women with higher education in 2002 (on the
X-axis) and the change in the share of women with higher education between 2002 and 2010 (on the Y-axis). The
slope (standard error) of the OLS fitted line is 0.331(0.034). The share with higher education is calculated as
population over 15 with complete higher education (including postsecondary education) over the total population
over 15. Sample includes 78 regions and 2 federal cities, Moscow and St. Petersburg.
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Figure 1.7: Changes in the Male and Female College Share and Wages
Notes: Panel A plots the relationship between the change in the share of men with higher education between 1989
and 2002 (on the X-axis) and the change in male average wages between 1998 and 2002 (on the Y-axis). The slope
(standard error) of the OLS fitted line is -656(109). Panel B plots the relationship between the change in the share of
women with higher education between 1989 and 2002 (on the X-axis) and the change in male average wages between
1998 and 2002 (on the Y-axis). The slope (standard error) of the OLS fitted line is -475(95). Panel C plots the
relationship between the change in the share of men with higher education between 2002 and 2010 (on the X-axis)
and the change in female average wages between 2002 and 2009 (on the Y-axis). The slope (standard error) of the
OLS fitted line is 1321(410). Panel D plots the relationship between the change in the share of women with higher
education between 2002 and 2010 (on the X-axis) and the change in female average wages between 2002 and 2009
(on the Y-axis). The slope (standard error) of the OLS fitted line is 1562(223). Nominal wages are measured in
rubles. Sample includes 76 regions and 2 federal cities Moscow and St. Petersburg. Wage data for Chechen republic
and Chelyabinsk region is not available.
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Figure 1.8: Russia/U.S. Comparison of Male/Female College Share by Cohort
Notes: Panel A depicts the share of Russian 25-34 years old male and female population with complete higher
education or a Postgraduate degree. Panel B shows the share of the US 25-34 years old male and female population
with a Bachelor’s degree or higher (Master’s, Professional, or Doctoral degree). Panel C shows the share of Russian
55-64 years old male and female population with complete higher education or a Postgraduate degree. Panel D shows
the share of the US 55-64 years old male and female population with a Bachelor’s degree or higher (Master’s,
Professional, or Doctoral degree).
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CHAPTER 2
COLLEGE EXPANSION AND THE MARGINAL RETURNS TO EDUCATION: EVIDENCE
FROM RUSSIA (WITH KLARA S. PETER AND CHRISTIAN M. POSSO)
2.1 Introduction
Over the last 20 years, many countries have expanded higher education and increased the num-
ber of college graduates. Between 1990 and 2010, the number of students in tertiary education
per 100,000 people has tripled in Brazil, India and Russia, and increased twelve-fold in China; the
number of colleges has also increased several-fold in the largest developing countries (Carnoy and
Wang (2013)). Answering pertinent policy question whether such rapid and massive college ex-
pansion is economically worthwhile requires proper analytical tools. To evaluate the effectiveness
of college expansion policies, analysts need to estimate the returns to college for the marginal in-
dividual who previously would not have had an opportunity to study in college and who is affected
by college expansion.
We evaluate the marginal returns to college in response to college openings using the case of
Russia.1 Between 1992 and 2003, the number of students in Russian higher education almost
tripled, the number of universities increased two-fold, and the number of municipalities with at
least one campus more than doubled.2 The legal framework for the Russian college expansion was
provided by the 1992 Law on Education, which allowed the opening of private universities and
1We provide a brief summary of the Soviet and Russian systems of higher education in the web appendix.
2Authors calculations.
legalized tuition-based programs and branches in public universities (Law (1992)).3 The early ex-
pansion period was accompanied by a rapid increase in the average college wage premium, as can
be seen in Figure 2.1. Following the low-return Soviet period with its compressed centralized wage
structure, the OLS-estimated average wage premium per year of college education surged from 2.8
percent in 1990 to about 8.7 percent in 1998 during Russias transition to a market economy, but
then the premium stabilized.
Our empirical strategy relies on the marginal treatment effect (MTE) method in its normal and
semi-parametric versions (Heckman and Vytlacil (2001), Heckman and Vytlacil (2005), Heckman
and Vytlacil (2007)) and a construction of policy treatment parameters (Heckman and Vytlacil
(2001); Carneiro and Vytlacil (2010)). Unlike the previous MTE studies that are based on ei-
ther cross-sectional data or one-cohort panels such as the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth
(NLSY), we study multiple cohorts, including ones that made their college decision in the pre-
expansion period (1985-1992) as well as cohorts that entered college during the expansion period
(1993-2003). Thus, we can evaluate the outcomes of actual, real-world college expansion rather
than a hypothetical increase in the probability of college attendance.
The identification of MTE relies on the variation in variables directly affecting the college de-
cision. These variables capture the institutional environment and economic conditions that prevail
during individuals late teenage years, the time when individuals make their college decisions.4 Our
key instrument, the number of campuses in the municipality of residence at age 17, measures the
extent of college expansion in Russia over time and across locations. This instrument is an im-
provement over a commonly used binary instrumental variable (IV) - the presence of a college in
the U.S. county of residence during teenage years (Card (1995); Cameron and Taber (2004)), as it
allows for computing policy-relevant treatment effects separately for the establishment of the first
3Russian institutions of higher education are referred to by a variety of names, including Universities, Institutes,
Academies, and Higher Schools. For compatibility of terminology with international literature on this topic, this
chapter uses the terms Universities and Colleges, even though the latter term is not technically accurate from the
Russian language point of view. Thus, such terms as College, University, and Institution of higher education are used
interchangeably throughout this chapter.
4See Card (2001) for a review of the variables (mainly cost shifters) that affect the schooling decision.
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campus in the locality that never had a college as well as for the marginal change in the number of
campuses. Since the instrument is numeric, its polynomial functional form is utilized to capture the
strong non-linear effects of college availability on college attainment and on the marginal returns.
We also provide several arguments and statistical tests to offset potential concerns with the validity
of this instrument.
Consistent with the MTE literature, we find that the returns to college are heterogeneous, and
that individuals with the highest propensity to go to college enjoy the largest marginal gains from
college education. We also find strong evidence of the positive sorting of individuals into col-
lege based on unobserved gains. The magnitude of the sorting gain in Russia a 5.7 percent wage
increase per year of college falls between the corresponding estimate of 2 percent for China (Heck-
man and Li (2004)) and 7.6 percent for the U.S. (Carneiro and Vytlacil (2011)).5
In addition to conventional treatment parameters, we estimate the returns to college for the
individuals who change college participation in response to a marginal increase in the number
of campuses. The estimated marginal policy-relevant treatment effect parameter of 9.6 percent
wage increase per year of college indicates large gains for the marginal individuals affected by
the establishment of new campuses. Our policy simulations show that the opening of a college
campus in constrained municipalities - smaller non-capital cities or municipalities that did not
have institutions of higher education prior to college expansion - attracts students with higher
returns compared to the effect of the same policy in unconstrained municipalities with more college
choices. In another policy simulation, we show that if the number of campuses per municipality
did not increase or remained at the 1992 level, then a considerable portion of population with high
potential gains from college education would not have been able to realize these gains. We also
find larger discounted net benefits for students from constrained municipalities by applying the
estimated returns in the traditional cost-benefit analysis.
5Our results support a comparative advantage model of the labor market rather than a single ability model, which
is consistent with the past literature on self-selection that goes back to Roy (1951). A large number of earlier studies
established empirical evidence of the non-random sorting of individuals into different levels of education and called
for the selectivity correction in the returns to schooling (e.g., Willis and Rosen (1979), Garen (1984), Bjorklund and
Moffitt (1987)).
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This chapter contributes to several strands of the literature. First, we contribute to the literature
on the marginal treatment effect of college education.6 Most of this literature uses the National
Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY) and considers changes in tuition as a policy affecting the
college decisions (Carneiro and Vytlacil (2010), Carneiro and Vytlacil (2011); Carneiro and Lee
(2009); Heckman and Urzua (2014); Heckman and Vytlacil (2001), Heckman and Vytlacil (2005)).
MTE estimates outside the U.S. are rare and often limited to a single cross section (Carneiro and
Umapathi (2011)) for Indonesia; Heckman and Li (2004) for China; Kyui (2013) for Russia; Za-
marro (2010) for Spain).7 College expansion in the MTE literature is either not modelled at all or
simulated as an additive exogenous change in the probability of college attendance. The key con-
tribution of our study is the estimation of the expansion-related marginal treatment effects. To the
best of our knowledge, this is the first study that utilizes data on actual college openings to derive
policy-relevant treatment parameters and evaluate counterfactual scenarios of college expansion.
We also show that the returns to college for marginal students vary considerably depending on
the scale of college expansion and the location of new campuses. Additionally, we extend the
MTE literature by using higher quality panel data with multiple wage observations, several birth
cohorts, disaggregated location information, and past economic conditions. As shown by Heck-
man and Todd (2006), cohort-based models fitted on repeated cross sections provide more reliable
estimates of the returns to education than the estimates obtained from a single cross section.
Second, our study is directly related to the literature that evaluates the effect of college expan-
sion on the returns to college. A number of earlier papers (Katz and Murphy (1992), Topel (1997),
among others) linked the increased supply of college graduates with a lower average college wage
6Outside the field of education, the MTE method is only beginning to be applied in a systematic way; e.g., see
Basu and Urzua (2007) and Evans and Basu (2011) for the MTE applications in health related topics. Moffitt (2014)
uses the MTE method to estimate the effect of a transfer program on labor supply.
7Carneiro and Umapathi (2011) computes the MTE of post-secondary education in Indonesia in 2000 using the
distance from the current village center to the nearest secondary school as an identifying restriction. Heckman and
Li (2004) estimate the MTE of college degree for a cross-sectional sample of young Chinese workers in 2000, us-
ing limited exclusion restrictions such as parental income and parental education. Kyui (2013) estimates standard
college-related treatment parameters using 2006 RLMS and provides the first application of the MTE method to Rus-
sia. Zamarro (2010) develops a new method for estimating MTE for multiple schooling levels and applies it to the
evaluation of the education reform in Spain.
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premium. Carneiro and Vytlacil (2011) and Moffitt (2008) show that an increase in college partic-
ipation leads to a decline in the marginal returns to college. We also find that college expansion
draws individuals with lower marginal returns to college. However, the general equilibrium ef-
fects were either offsetting or not strong enough to shift considerably the aggregate equilibrium
skill prices and their distribution. In this paper, we do not disentangle varying general equilibrium
effects of college expansion and leave this question for future research.8
Third, this chapter contributes to the literature evaluating the effect of new universities on
college enrollment. We find that the opening of the first campus in Russian municipalities where
there were previously no colleges increases the probability of receiving a college degree by 11
percentage points. Studies from other countries also report positive, but lower effects of a new
university on college enrollment, e.g., 8 percentage points in Italy (Oppedisano (2011)) and 6.4
percentage points in Canada (Frenette (2009)).
Fourth, our use of the number of campuses in the municipality of residence at age 17 as
a supply-side instrument for college education builds upon previous applications of supply-side
shifters in identifying the returns to schooling; some earlier examples include construction of ele-
mentary schools in Indonesia (Duflo (2001)), a dummy for living near college (Card (1995)), the
distance to the nearest college (Kane and Rouse (1995)) and supply disruptions caused by a war
(Ichino and Winter-Ebmer (2004)).
Finally, our paper contributes to a large literature on the returns to education during the tran-
sition to a market economy (Andren and Sapatoru (2005); Brainerd (1998); Fang and Zeckhauser
(2012); Fleisher and Wang (2005); Gorodnichenko and Peter (2005); Munich and Terrell (2005);
Yang (2005), among many others). We improve this literature by estimating the distribution of
returns, applying a more rigorous identification strategy, and deriving policy-relevant parameters
for individuals at the margin of choice. Yet, we also confirm a previously documented pattern of
increasing returns to schooling during the early transition period, followed by their levelling out in
8In the accompanying paper, we show that the expansion of higher education in Russia worsened the quality of
college entrants, reduced resources per student, and increased the market returns to college quality (Belskaya and Peter
(2015)).
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the later period.
2.2 Econometric Framework
2.2.1 Model set-up
To estimate the heterogeneous returns to college, we follow a semi-structural method developed
by Carneiro and Vytlacil (2011). The decision rule of an individual i is characterized by a latent
variable model of college enrollment:
Si = 1(S
∗
i > 0), where S
∗
i = µS(Zi)− i (2.1)
Si is a binary variable indicating college enrollment; it equals one for college graduates and
zero for high school graduates.9 We approximate µS(Zi) by a linear form given by Z ′iγ, where Zi is
a vector of observable characteristics that affect the college decision. Vector Zi includes three type
of variables: (i) variables that affect both the schooling decision and wages, XSi ; (ii) variables that
measure the extent of college expansion at the time when individuals make their college decisions,
Ei; and (iii) other instrumental variables/exclusion restrictions that also shift the latent variable S∗i ,
Ii:
Si = 1(E
′
iγE +X
S
i
′γX + I ′iγI > i) (2.2)
We assume that i is an unobserved to the econometrician error term that is statistically inde-
pendent of Zi. It captures the marginal cost of obtaining a college education for individual i.
Let P(Z) denote the probability of selecting into treatment (college) given Z. It is convenient
to rewrite the selection equation (8.2) using the following innocuous transformation. Define νi =
F(i), where F is a cumulative distribution function, and νi is distributed uniformly in the unit
interval [0, 1]. Different values of νi denote different percentiles of i. Thus, the selection equation
9Following the tradition of the literature, the college drop-out decision is not modelled in this study. Russia has a
relatively high completion rate of 79 percent of college entrants completing a tertiary type A program compared to the
OECD average of 69 percent and the U.S. college completion rate of 56 percent (OECD (2008)).
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becomes
Si = 1(P (Zi) > νi) (2.3)
Let the outcome of interest be Yi =ln(wi), where wi is an hourly wage. The potential outcomes
are defined according to the level of education achieved such that
Yi,s = µS(Xi) + εi,s for s = 0, 1 (2.4)
where Xi = (Xwi , X
S
i ) is a vector of observable characteristics that affect hourly wages, and X
w
i
include exogenous wage determinants that are excluded from the college choice equation (e.g., an
individuals age at time t and unanticipated transitory shocks to local labor markets). We assume
that µs(Xi) is linear, µs(Xi) = X ′iβs.
The observed outcome Yi can be written in a switching regression form:
Yi = SiYi,1 + (1− Si)Yi,0 (2.5)
= Si(X
′
iβ1 + εi,1) + (1− Si)(X ′iβ0 + εi,0)
= X ′iβ0 + Si(X
′
iβ1 −X ′iβ0) + Si(εi,1 − εi,0) + εi,0
The gross returns to college education are given by ∆i = Yi,1−Yi,0 = (X ′iβ1−X ′iβ0) + (εi,1−
εi,0) and the model assumes that agents know their returns.
The mean outcome Yi, conditional on (P (Zi) = p,Xi = x), is a sum of mean outcomes for
each level of education and weighted by the probability of being at each level of education:
E[Yi|Xi = x, P (Zi) = p] = E[Yi|Si = 1, x, p]p+ E[Yi|Si = 0, x, p](1− p)
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= x′β0 + (x′β1 − x′β0)p+
p∫
0
E[(εi,1 − εi,0)|Xi = x, νi = ν]dν (2.6)
The vector (Z,X) is observed by both the agent and econometrician, while (ε1, ε0, ) is known
by the agent but unobserved by the econometrician. To understand the possible effects of unob-
served endowments in the wage equation (εs) on the returns, we consider three cases: (i) unob-
served endowments are homogeneous, i.e. εi,0 = εi,1 = ε¯ for all individuals, such that the last term
in equation (2.6) cancels out; (ii) unobserved endowments are heterogeneous but mean indepen-
dent of college decisions, i.e., E[(εi,1− εi,0)|Xi = x, νi = ν] = E[(εi,1− εi,0)]; again the last term
in equation (2.6) cancels out; and (iii) unobserved endowments are heterogeneous, εi,0 6= εi,1, and
correlated with the unobserved characteristics from the college decision equation (i), in which
case the last term in equation (2.6) cannot be ignored.
In the first two cases, the standard IV approach might be sufficient to identify the average
returns to college education. In the third case, which is more realistic, individuals, who are obser-
vationally identical from an econometricians point of view, may make different college decisions;
that is, unobserved characteristics influencing the college decision are correlated with unobserved
endowments ε’s in the wage equation. As a result, the returns to college, for observationally iden-
tical individuals, will depend upon a conditional mean component E[(X ′iβ1 − X ′iβ0)|Xi = x] =
(x′β1 − x′β0) and an individual-specific unobserved component E[(εi,1 − εi,0)|Xi = x, νi = ν].
In the third case, the standard IV approach may not be appropriate for estimating the parame-
ters of interest. It is widely recognized that an IV estimator identifies the local average treatment
effect (LATE), which is the expected gain from the treatment (e.g., college graduation) of those
individuals who switch from no treatment to treatment when an instrument changes. In the case of
several instruments, each of the IVs identifies a different margin of the return to college that varies
across individuals. In general, there is no simple interpretation of the IV estimator in the presence
of several instruments that induce individuals to go to college.10
10Heckman and Vytlacil (2005), Heckman and Vytlacil (2007) present a limited number of cases where it is possible
to determine the exact average treatment parameter identified by each of the instruments.
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2.2.2 Marginal Treatment Effect from the Normal Selection Model
The marginal treatment effect (MTE) approach allows researchers to obtain the entire distribu-
tion of the individual-specific returns (i.e., [(εi,1 − εi,0)|Xi = x, νi = ν] (Heckman and Vytlacil
(2005), Heckman and Vytlacil (2007)). Using equation (8.6), the MTE(x, ν) is defined as follows
MTE(x, ν) =
∂E[Y |X = x, P (z) = p]
∂p
= (x′β1 − x′β0) + E[(εi,1 − εi,0)|Xi = x, νi = ν] (2.7)
We assume that Zi includes at least one exclusion restriction, and Zi and Xi are statistically
independent of (εi,0, εi,1, i). We first estimate MTE(x, ν) from the parametric selection model
that assumes a multivariate normal distribution of errors, (εi,0, εi,1, i) ∼ N(0,Ω). Under the above
assumptions, E[(εi,1 − εi,0)|Xi = x, νi = ν] =(Cov(εi,1, i)-Cov(εi,0, i))Φ−1(ν), where Φ−1() is
the inverse of the standard normal cumulative distribution function, and MTE(x, ν) is given by
MTE(x, ν) = (x′β1 − x′β0) + (Cov(εi,1, i)− Cov(εi,0, i))Φ−1(ν) (2.8)
Heckman and Vytlacil (2005), Heckman and Vytlacil (2007) show how, based on the MTE
distribution, to recover several standard treatment parameters such as the average treatment effect
in the population ATE(x), the average treatment effect on the treated TT (x), the average treat-
ment effect on the untreated TUT (x), the ordinary least squared estimator OLS(x), and the IV
estimator IV (x). In short, each treatment parameter can be obtained as a weighted average of
MTE(x, ν), where weights are given in Appendix Table C3.
2.2.3 Policy Parameters
In addition to the standard treatment effect parameters, we also calculate the returns to college
for those individuals who went to college due to the college expansion policy. The objective here
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is to calculate the gains of the marginal graduates who would have had limited access to higher
education if the college expansion did not occur, but they chose to go to college in response to
the opening of more colleges in the place of their residence. In other words, we are interested in
the returns of the marginal graduates whose college decision was influenced by an increase in the
instrument Ei in equation (2.2).
To illustrate our parameter of interest, we perform the following experiment using the estimated
parameters of selection equation (2.2). Suppose that an individual i gets a draw given by ˜i such
that ˜i > E ′iγE + X
′
iγX + I
′
iγI , which implies that Si = 0. Further, suppose that the total number
of college campuses available to an individual i in his region of residence at the age of 17 increases
such that the new number of campuses is given by E∗i = Ei + α. Our parameter of interest is the
average of MTE(x, ν) for those individuals who switch their decision because of the expansion,
such that ˜i < E∗
′
i γE +X
′
iγX + I
′
iγI , which implies that S
′
i = 1.
Heckman and Vytlacil (2001) develop a policy relevant treatment effect (PRTE(x)) parameter
that measures the average returns to college education for individuals induced to change their
schooling decisions in response to a specific policy (for instance, E∗i = Ei + α). Essentially,
PRTE(x) is the average MTE(x, ν) for switchers and is defined as:
PRTE(x, α) =
∫
MTE(x, ν)fν|X(ν˜|x, Si(Ei = e, x, I) = 0, Si(Ei = e+ α, x, I) = 1)dν˜
(2.9)
To identify PRTE(x, α), the support condition needs to be met, that is, the range of P (E∗i , Xi, Ii)
must be contained in the range of P (Ei, Xi, Ii). PRTE is generally applied to a fixed discrete pol-
icy change. Examples of specific policies evaluated with this method in the past include a tuition
change in the US (Heckman and Vytlacil (2001); Carneiro and Vytlacil (2010), Carneiro and Vyt-
lacil (2011); Eisenhauer and Vytlacil (2015)) and a 10 percent reduction in the distance to upper
secondary schools in Indonesia (Carneiro and Umapathi (2011)). The PRTE approach has not been
applied yet with respect to college expansion.
Alternatively, Carneiro and Vytlacil (2010) proposed the marginal policy relevant treatment
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effect (MPRTE(x)), which corresponds to a marginal change in policy α. That is,
MPRTE(x) = limα→0PRTE(x, α) (2.10)
The MPRTE method essentially estimates the mean benefits of college for the marginal indi-
viduals who are indifferent between participating and not participating in college. The estimator
requires the availability of a continuous instrument, assuming an infinitesimal change in α.
2.2.4 Marginal Policy Effects Using Local IV
An alternative approach to estimating MTE is based on the semi-parametric method of local
instrumental variables ( Heckman and Vytlacil (2005) ). Under the assumption that Zi and Xi are
statistically independent of (εi,0, εi,1, i), equation (2.6) can be re-written as follows:
E[Yi|Xi = x, P (Zi) = p] = x′β0 + (x′β1 − x′β0)p+K(p) (2.11)
where K(p) = E[(εi,1 − εi,0)|Xi = x, P (Zi) = p]p for p ∈ P (Zi)
The MTE estimation process follows Carneiro and Lee (2009) and consists of three steps:
1) In the first step, we obtain the propensity score, pˆ, from a probit regression of Si on Zi =
{XSi , Ii, Ei}.
2) In the second step, we estimate {βˆ0, βˆ1} using a partially linear regression estimator of Robinson
(1988) and then compute R = Y − x′βˆ0 − (x′βˆ1 − x′βˆ0)pˆ. The estimates of {βˆ0, βˆ1} are provided
in the web appendix.
3) In the third step, we estimate a locally quadratic regression of R on pˆ and calculate the deriva-
tives of the conditional mean estimate K ′(pˆ).
After completing these steps, the MTE estimates are obtained according to equation (2.7):
ˆMTE(x, ν) =
∂E[Y |X = x, P (z) = p]
∂p
= (x′βˆ1 − x′βˆ0) +K ′(pˆ) (2.12)
Compared to the normal selection model, the local IV method for estimating MTE is more
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flexible as it does not assume the normal structure of the error term. But it is also more restrictive
in the sense that the MTE can be estimated with this method only over the common support of
P (Zi), which rarely takes the entire full unit interval [0, 1]. Since it is practically impossible to
estimate the MTE over the full unit interval, the standard treatment parameters such as ATE, TT,
TUT, as well as PRTE cannot be identified using the semi-parametric approach. Nonetheless, it is
possible to identify the MPRTE parameters because only the marginal support of P (Zi) is required
in this case (Carneiro and Vytlacil (2010)). In our empirical work, we apply the local IV method
to recover the marginal returns to college for the individuals responding to a marginal change in
the probability of college participation and in the number of campuses.
The following section discusses how each of the model variables (Ei, Xi, Ii) is measured in the
data.
2.3 Data and Identification Variables
The primary data source for this study is the 1995-2011 Russia Longitudinal Monitoring Sur-
vey - Higher School of Economics (RLMS-HSE), which is a nationally representative stratified
sample of households of the Russian Federation.11 We limit the sample to high school graduates,
age 25 and older, assuming that the majority of people complete their formal education by age
25. We also restrict our sample to people born between 1968 and 1986. Thus, considering that
the college decision in Russia is typically made at age 17, our sample includes individuals who
made their college decision in the pre-expansion period (1985-1992) as well as those who did it
during the expansion period (1993-2003). Compared to the previous studies that are based on ei-
ther cross-sectional data or one-cohort panels such as NLSY, our multi-cohort panel not only has
multiple wage observations over the individual life cycle, but also permits the analysis of schooling
decisions for several cohorts, thus making the study of college expansion feasible.
11RLMS-HSE is organized by the National Research University Higher School of Economics, Moscow together
with the Carolina Population Center at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill and the Institute of Sociology
at the Russian Academy of Sciences. The panel started in 1994. The RLMS-HSE surveyed individuals in 32 out of 83
regions and all seven federal districts of the Russian Federation (according to the official classification of regions as
of January 1, 2010). We drop the year 1994, because the education questionnaire in that year is incompatible with the
one in subsequent survey rounds.
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The wage variable is the log of deflated hourly wage rate at primary job. As mentioned above,
we restrict the period of college decision making to years 1985-2003. Our preferred specification
employs individual wage data from the post college decision period, 2004-2011. However, in the
robustness checks, we consider other intervals of wage data.
To estimate the college decision equation (8.2), we define the treatment group as college gradu-
ates and above (four years or more of tertiary education with a diploma) whereas the control group
as secondary school graduates. The latter category includes graduates of both general and profes-
sional secondary schools, but excludes college drop-outs.12 In some of the robustness checks, the
definition of the treatment group includes college drop-outs with three or more years of college
education. Figure 2.2 shows that the share of college graduates increased from 23 percent in 1995
to 39 percent in 2011 in the 25-44 age group of the RLMS sample.
We linked RLMS respondents with the local characteristics at age 17, which are available either
at the level of municipality (such as the number of campuses by category) or at a more aggregate
regional level (such as the size of cohort, earnings, and unemployment rate). The location of
respondents at age 17 is not directly reported by the RLMS respondents, but it can be inferred in the
majority of cases from the survey questions related to migration history, completion of high school,
and college location. For example, location at 17 is the same as the place of current residence in
three instances: (i) for individuals who permanently moved to their present location before they
turned 18 years old (including those who never moved); (ii) for individuals who completed high
school at present location; and (iii) for individuals who are born in the place of current residence
and who temporarily moved to another location after age 17. College location is taken as location
at 17 for those respondents who reported to reside in the same community before going to college.
Thus, location at age 17 is known with high confidence for 83 percent of our sample.13 The location
of the remaining 17 percent of our sample at age 17 (e.g., those born in a different municipality
12Professional secondary schools include vocational schools (PTU), technical schools (technikums) and the spe-
cialized schools that train associate professionals in various fields (such as medicine, education, business, etc.). They
offer 3-4-year programs after 9 years of secondary schools or 2-3-year programs after 11 years of complete general
secondary education.
13Our sample excludes respondents who were born and studied outside Russia.
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and moved to a current residence after completing college) is unknown. We impute their location
at age 17 based on college location and the type of birthplace such as village, township, and city
(see Appendix Table C1 for details of imputation).14
Table C.1 categorizes the variables used in the wage and schooling equations. Individual char-
acteristics such as gender (=1 if female), nationality (=1 if ethnically Russian), and mothers educa-
tion (=1 if mother has a college degree) enter both the wage and schooling equations. Since current
urban residence is likely to be anticipated at the time of college decision, it theoretically explains
both the wage and schooling outcomes. Year dummies, age, and age squared are controlled for
in the wage equation, while four birth cohort dummies with 5-year intervals are included in the
college equation. Dummies for the Moscow city and seven federal districts are determined at age
17 in the college equation and at the current time in wage equations.
Another variable that is expected to affect both the college decision and wage is the regional
cohort size, which is the log of regional population of age 17 at the time when an individual was
17. Individuals from larger cohorts are likely to face more intense competition for a limited num-
ber of university slots in their region and thus have a lower probability of getting into college. The
wage effect of larger cohorts is ambiguous due to a downward pressure from the labor supply side
and an upward pressure from a bigger market size and potentially higher demand for labor. The
data source for this variable is the Russian Census and other official demographic statistics (see
Appendix Table C1 for details). Historically, the cohort size varied significantly not only between
regions but also within regions over time due to the large demographic changes associated with the
long-lasting effects of WWII and low birth rates in the 1990s in Russia (see Figure 2.2). In our
sample period between 1985 and 2003, however, the fluctuations over time were relatively mild,
14In the 1990s, more than half of the internal migration flows were registered within a given region, e.g., from rural
areas to cities of the same region (Demography (2002)). Furthermore, in our RLMS sample, 62 percent of college
students with the known place of birth studied in the same municipality as their birthplace, 22 percent studied in a
different municipality of the same region, and only 16 percent studied in a different region. Given these facts, we can
randomly assign the missing location at age 17 based on the type of birthplace (village, township, and city), college
location for students, and current residence for non-students. For example, if a student was born in a township, then an
arbitrary township would be chosen within the region of his college as a place of his college decision. For non-students,
we choose a random municipality of the same type as their birthplace within the region of their current residence. Note
that such imputations affect only one variable of interest, which is the number of campuses per municipality, since all
other local variables are constructed at the regional level.
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though significant regional variation remained.
2.3.1 Number of Campuses per Municipality
The key identification variable through which we perform policy simulations is the number of
campuses available in a municipality at age 17. We discuss its identification validity in Section
4. This variable is constructed based on the opening/closing dates of campuses from the Russian
university database (Belskaya and Peter (2015)). The number of campuses in each municipality
measures the local availability of college education at the time when individuals make their college
enrollment decisions, and it serves as a proxy for Ei in equation (2.2). It is also broken down by
categories of public-private and main campus-branch.
The descriptive statistics for this variable confirm a rapid expansion of college availability in
Russia following the 1992 Law on Education. Between 1985 and 2003, the number of campuses
in the Russian university database surged from 812 to 2245, and the number of municipalities
with at least one campus increased from 198 to 442. Excluding Moscow city, the average number
of campuses per municipality in the RLMS sample more than doubled over the sample period,
with mean = 6.9 and std. dev. = 13.9 (see Figure 2.2). The upsurge of new campuses was also
particularly striking in the Moscow region where their number quadrupled.
Despite seemingly large changes in the number of campuses over time, the share of within-
municipality variance is only about 13 percent of the total variance. The variance decomposition
reported in Table A.2 indicates that most variation in the total number of campuses is between
municipalities (87 percent). However, the composition of variance differs considerably by the type
of campus. For instance, the fact that the number of public universities barely changed since the
Soviet times is reflected in the near to zero within-municipality variance (less than 1 percent of
the total variance); practically all the variation in this variable comes from the differences between
municipalities. At the same time, the within-municipality variation over time is substantial for
the number of branches (both public and private) and for the number of private universities (32 to
55 percent each). These features of the main variable will be utilized in the validity tests of our
instrument.
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2.3.2 Local Labor Market Conditions
Besides the number of campuses per municipality at age 17, we also use labor market condi-
tions in the location of residence at the time of college decisions as additional exclusion restrictions.
Local earnings and unemployment rate are frequently used as instruments in the MTE literature
(e.g., Cameron and Heckman (1998), Cameron and Taber (2004), Carneiro and Vytlacil (2011),
Zamarro 2010, Eisenhauer and Vytlacil (2015), among others).15 In our case, regional earnings at
17 and regional unemployment rate at 17 capture the opportunity cost of going to college.
To control for the potential correlation between local wage/unemployment at age 17 and current
individual wage, we include (i) the contemporaneous (transitory) component of regional variables
in the wage equations and (ii) the permanent (predicted) component of regional variables in both
the schooling and wage equations (similar to Cameron and Heckman (1998); Carneiro and Vytlacil
(2011)); see Table C.1.
The transitory shocks to regional labor markets are proxied by the deviation of contemporane-
ous regional earnings and unemployment rate from the trend-adjusted regional average. Specifi-
cally, regional transitory earnings are defined as ˆrt in a regression of the log of regional monthly
earnings in region r and year t on the set of regional dummies µr and a quadratic time trend, as in
ln(wrt) = µr + ϕ(t) + rt. The regional transitory unemployment rate is defined similarly.
The permanent regional variables are predicted from the regressions of regional monthly earn-
ings and unemployment rate on region dummies and a quadratic time trend over the period 1995-
2011. Essentially, these are trend-adjusted average characteristics of the local labor market. As an
alternative measure of permanent earnings, we compute average regional monthly earnings over
the first 10 years following the college decision. To account for the possibility that individuals
making a college decision under the Soviet centralized wage structure may not have anticipated the
future market earnings due to a large structural break in the economy, we also compute permanent
15Local tuition as another commonly used IV is not applicable to our case because college tuition was not charged
during the Soviet period and only 28 percent of all public students paid a fee for their education during our sample
period of college expansion, 1993-2003 (Education (2008)).
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regional earnings separately for the Soviet period (1980-1991) and the market period (1992-2011).
In essence, with the above structure of regional variables, we assume that individuals making
their college decision are not only influenced by the observed contemporaneous characteristics of
their location at age 17, but also have an imperfect foresight at age 17 of future local labor market
conditions.
In addition to the regional monthly earnings and unemployment rate at age 17, the opportunity
cost of going to college is captured by the country-level skill wage ratio at age 17, which is the
ratio of average wages of manual workers to average wages of non-manual workers in industry
(see Appendix Table C1 for data sources). Throughout the Soviet period, manual workers were
rewarded with high pay, while wages of non-manual workers were artificially compressed. Figure
2.2 shows that the wage ratio plummeted from 0.94 to 0.55 during our sample period (1985-2003),
reflecting a historic trend of the rising wage premium for skilled workers.
2.3.3 Summary Statistics for the Estimation Sample
The baseline estimation sample (age ≥ 25, age 17 ∈ [1985, 2003], wage ∈ [2004, 2011], and
non-missing variables) amounts to 17,911 person-year observations. Conditional on the exogenous
sample constraints based on age, survey year, and birth cohorts and for a given definition of the col-
lege variable, wage is missing for about 20 percent of respondents either due to non-employment
or non-reporting. In robustness checks, we apply the inverse propensity score re-weighting to deal
with the selection into wages (i.e., employment or reporting of wages). With the exception of
mothers education, the missing values in other covariates are trivial (about 0.6 percent).16 Table
C1 in the appendix details how each variable is constructed. The descriptive statistics in Table A.3
is reported separately for college graduates and secondary school graduates. As expected, college
graduates are more likely to be female, reside in urban areas, have a mother with college degree,
live in municipalities with more campuses at age 17, and earn a higher wage rate. Interestingly,
16Because mothers education is unknown for the 12 percent of our estimation sample, we include a binary indicator
for missing values of this variable to prevent sample loss. We drop observations with missing values in other covariates.
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when college graduates were 17, they resided in areas with lower earnings and higher unemploy-
ment rates, but their regions of residence at the time of the survey had better permanent labor
market characteristics.
2.4 Marginal Treatment Effect
2.4.1 Baseline Estimates
In this section, we report the MTE estimates of the marginal benefits of college education
and discuss the validity of exclusion restrictions. We begin by estimating the components of the
switching regression model given in Equations (2.2)-(2.4). The random variables (εi,0, εi,1, i) are
assumed to have a multivariate normal distribution, and the model is estimated using maximum
likelihood. Table A.4 presents the estimates of the wage equation for secondary school graduates
(column 1), the wage equation for college graduates (column 2), the college equation (column 3),
and the marginal effects of variables in the college equation (column 4). The probability of having
a college degree, Pˆ (Z), is significantly higher among females, ethnically non-Russians, urban
residents, and those whose mother went to college. As expected, individuals from smaller regional
cohorts at age 17 tend to have a higher rate of college attainment, as they face less competition
for a given number of college openings in their region. More people go to college in the regions
with higher permanent earnings, but college decisions do not appear to be responsive to regional
unemployment rates and to regional earnings at age 17. Predictably, better salaries of manual
workers relative to non-manual workers - observed at age 17 - deter people from pursuing a college
degree.
The instruments are jointly strong predictors of college decision (p-value=0.000). The key
instrument measuring the college availability at the time when an individual was 17 is the total
number of college campuses per municipality. This variable serves as a cost shifter of college de-
cisions. In order to capture potential non-linear effects of college availability and to account for the
fact that some of the larger cities had a wide choice of colleges even before the college expansion
(e.g., Moscow had 100 colleges in 1990), we add a quadratic term on the number of campuses. Be-
cause the distribution of the number of campuses is clumping at zero, we also introduce a binary
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variable to indicate municipalities with no campuses (mean=0.386). The latter variable is analo-
gous to a commonly used binary IV, such as the presence of a college in the county of residence
during teenage years (Card (1995); Cameron and Taber (2004)). Results in Table A.4 suggest that
the opening of the first campus in a municipality without a college increases the probability of
receiving a college degree by 0.114, i.e., by 11 percentage points, on average, ceteris paribus. The
establishment of additional campuses also improves the college attainment, though at a diminish-
ing rate per new campus. Thus, the effect of college availability on college attainment appears to
be much stronger for constrained municipalities with fewer campuses.
The estimates of the wage equations for the two groups are standard.17 The results suggest that
each group has a comparative advantage in the labor market, that is, the individuals with a higher
propensity to go to college (low ν) tend to do well in the labor market once they graduate (σ1 =
−0.150), but the same individuals would be worse off if they dont go to college (σ0 = 0.222).
Following Carneiro and Vytlacil (2011) and Heckman and Urzua (2010), we perform a test for
selection on gains (i.e., whether returns to college are correlated with S). A simple test involves
estimating equation (2.6) where the last term is approximated with a polynomial in pˆ (obtained
from the probit of college equation) and testing whether the coefficients on higher order polyno-
mial terms are jointly statistically significant. The results of this test support the hypothesis that
individuals in our sample select on college gains (see Appendix Table C2). The test rejects that the
returns to college are not correlated with S or that MTE(x, ν) is constant in ν.
Another test for selection on gains relies on the estimated parameters from the normal switching
regression model (Table A.4). The null hypothesis that the slope of the MTE is zero, i.e., H0 :
σ1 − σ0 = 0, is rejected at the 1 percent level. We estimate that σ1 − σ0=-0.372 with a standard
error of 0.065. This finding supports the conclusion of selection on gains in Table C2 that does not
impose the joint normality assumption.
17The results worth mentioning are: a very large gender wage gap in the control group (0.45 log points or 56 percent
difference favoring males) compared to 27 percent in the treatment group; mothers education affects wages of college
graduates, but not wages of secondary school graduates; the individual wage rate in both groups is positively influenced
by higher transitory and permanent local earnings; only in the control group, the wage rate responds positively to local
unemployment (both transitory and permanent); the cohorts with larger regional population at 17 receive a higher
wage premium today.
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Using the estimated parameters in Table A.4, we compute the MTE according to Equation
(2.8). Figure 2.3 plots the estimated MTE for a grid of values v between zero and one,18 with
90-percent confidence bands, evaluated at mean values of X. We obtain annualized estimates of
the returns to college by dividing the MTE by 4.5, which is the average difference in years of
schooling between the treatment and control groups in our sample. The negative slope of MTE
implies that individuals with low values of ν (those who are more likely to go to college) have the
largest marginal returns to one year of college education. Conversely, individuals with high values
of ν have low MTE. The heterogeneity in the MTE across the distribution of ν is substantial: the
returns vary from -18.2 percent for the highest ν person who would lose from attending college to
32.9 percent for the lowest ν person, with the average return of 7.3 percent per one year of college
education.
Given the vast differences in labor market institutions and data characteristics between Russia
and the U.S., our MTE estimates for Russia turned out to be surprisingly close to the findings of
Carneiro and Vytlacil (2011). In a sample of 28 to 34-year old white males from NLSY, they find
that the college returns in the U.S. vary from -15.6 percent to 28.8 percent per year of college with
the mean of 6.7 percent and the MTE slope σ1 − σ0 = −0.239. At the same time, our MTE
estimates for Russia are lower at the mean and have a much larger variance than the correspond-
ing estimates obtained by Heckman and Li (2004) in a cross-sectional sample of Chinese workers
(their MTE ranges from 5 to 15 percent per year of college, mean=10.8).
2.4.2 Alternative Instruments
In Table 2.5, our main instrument - number of campuses per municipality - is broken down
by categories of main campus-branch (column 1), public-private 19 (column 2), Moscow vs. other
cities (column 3). Overall, these results are not different from the baseline specification. We find a
18In practice, we restrict the grid of values of ν to be between 0.001 and 0.999, with 999 equally spaced points.
19We use a dummy indicator for private campuses instead of the number of campuses due to considerable clustering
of observations at values of zero and one: only 10 percent of all municipalities in the RLMS sample had more than
one private campus.
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negative MTE slope of similar magnitude, average returns of 7 to 8 percent per year of college, and
a clear concave relationship between college availability and college attainment for all indicators.
But the college probability function is estimated to be considerably more concave with respect
to the number of branches. This result could be partly explained by branches rather than main
campuses being opened in less-populated areas where the first few local branches may have a
substantial impact on local college attainment (hence, large positive linear term), and where the
establishment of further branches may also quickly overcrowd a local market for higher education
services (hence, large negative quadratic term). Lower tuition fees and laxer admission criteria
in branches could also contribute to a high response of the probability of going to college to the
opening of the first few branches in locality.
Another noteworthy finding is that the establishment of a private campus in a municipality
with existing public campuses does not have a statistically significant effect on the probability
of college attainment.20 This result could be due to the fact that private education institutions in
Russia are charging higher tuition, are often small in size and tend to open in larger cities where
individuals have other options of pursuing a college degree. In the third column of Table 2.5, we try
to isolate the effect of college-crowded Moscow by the interaction of the number of campuses per
municipality at 17 with Moscow residence at 17 in a linear specification. The estimates suggest that
the college attainment in Moscow is not affected by a further increase in the number of campuses,
but the opening of an additional campus in other municipalities with at least one campus increases
the probability of receiving a college degree by 0.4 percentage points. All parameters of interest
remain akin to the baseline specification.
Starting with the paper of Card (1995)), the literature raised two major issues with the validity
of a binary indicator for college presence as an instrument, including non-random college con-
struction and the Tiebout-type geographic sorting of individuals in response to college presence.
These are legitimate concerns with regard to the number of campuses as well. The validity of the
20Interestingly, in a paper on the effect of mothers education on birth outcomes in the U.S., Currie and Moretti
(2003) also found that the opening of public colleges has a larger effect on mothers educational attainment than the
opening of private colleges.
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instrument is going to be compromised if:
• s in wage equation affect Ei in college equation; that is, anticipated wage shocks in 2004-
2011 influence where new campuses are opened in 1985-2003;
• Ei and s are jointly determined; for example, individuals with, let say, positive wage draws
choose to reside in the location of new campuses.
To isolate the potential correlation between future expected earnings and campus openings,
both wage and schooling equations control for the predicted regional earnings and unemployment
rate in the place of residence at 17. Adding district fixed effects and a dummy for the type of
location serves the same purpose. These controls partly address the above concerns, including
non-random college openings in response to higher regional income and the sorting of individuals
with higher wage draws into the locations with better labor market conditions, which also happened
to be places with more campuses.
The variance decomposition in Table A.2 gives us useful hints to check whether our baseline
results are driven by the time-series or cross-sectional variation in the number of campuses. A
large within-municipality variation in the number of campuses over time provides more room for
the endogenous decisions to open campuses in response to unobserved (by the econometrician)
future wage shocks. At the same time, the cross-sectional/geographic variation that is created in a
different economic system long before the college expansion started does not allow for such strate-
gic behavior. Table A.2 shows that most of the variation in the number of campuses is geographic
rather than over time (87 percent vs. 13 percent). Furthermore, we re-estimate our baseline speci-
fication with the number of public colleges only. This number remained practically the same since
the Soviet times; the within-municipality variance is less than 1 percent of the total variance (Table
A.2). We can reasonably assume that the college construction decision under the centrally-planned
industrial structure is not correlated with wage innovations in the market economy. The alternative
specification with the number of public colleges does not change the value and the slope of the
marginal treatment effect (column 4 of Table 2.5).
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We also ran several placebo tests by adding future college openings in the college equation.21
The goal here is to check whether college decisions are influenced by the future college expansion.
One of such tests is shown in column 5 of Table 2.5 and suggests that newly opened campuses in
the same municipality between the ages of 25 and 30 do not have any significant impact on the
likelihood of going to college at age 17.
Therefore, provided that the anticipated local labor market conditions are sufficiently controlled
for, the number of campuses at age 17 can be used as a sensible instrument for the marginal treat-
ment effect estimation and subsequent policy simulations.
2.4.3 Alternative Specifications
Before calculating the treatment parameters, we check whether our results are sensitive to
changes in specifications. Specifically, we focus on the sensitivity of the mean component of
MTE, X¯(βˆ1− βˆ0), and the covariance component of MTE, (σ1−σ0). The estimates of additional
specifications are presented in Table 2.6. In all of these specifications, the instruments are jointly
strong predictors of college decisions, and the null hypothesis that the MTE slope is zero, H0 :
σ1 − σ0 = 0, is rejected at the one percent level. In column 1, the model is estimated using an
alternative definition of the treatment group that includes college dropouts with three or more years
of higher education. The rationale for changing the dependent variable is that college dropouts with
some years of schooling might also have been treated by studying in college.
In column 2, we use an alternative definition of regional permanent earnings calculated as av-
erage regional earnings over the first ten years since college decision at age 17. Specification in
column 3 applies the same definition as in column 2 but replaces permanent earnings with the
Soviet period average regional earnings (1980-1991) for individuals who turned 17 before market
reforms. Our motivation here is that teenagers raised under central planning may not have fore-
known future earnings in the market economy. As we introduce Soviet earnings, the association
21For example, we controlled for the number of campuses established in the same municipality between the ages
of 30 and 35; then we tried adding new campuses opened between 2007 and 2011. None of these variables have any
significant impact on the likelihood of going to college at age 17.
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between individual wages and regional permanent earnings becomes weaker but remains statisti-
cally significant.22 Overall, modifications in the first three columns do not cause any significant
deviation of the estimated MTE from a baseline specification.
To check for potential bias due to non-random missing wages, specification in column 4 ap-
plies the inverse propensity weighting (IPW) to our baseline specification, where the weight is
the inverse of the predicted probability of having non-missing wages. The propensity score is con-
structed using the model covariatesXS andXW , which are available for all respondents, including
those with missing wages.23 The MTE estimates are not affected by the IPW correction.
We also estimate the model without assuming the joint normality between the errors of the
wage and college equations. Figure 2.4 shows the MTE using the semiparametric procedure we
described in section 2. Overall, the shape of the MTE and policy parameters we discuss in the next
section are consistent with the fully parametric normal model.
Next, we test whether our results change if we use wage data for different survey years. Figure
2.5 plots the average treatment effect and the MTE slope along with the 95-percent confidence in-
terval for different periods of the wage data; the point estimates from the 1995-2011 sample period
is also shown in column 5 of Table 2.6. Although the average returns to college appear to decline
over time, there is no statistically significant (at the 5 percent level) difference in the average returns
to college between different survey periods. The MTE slope is also constant over different periods.
It seems that the general equilibrium effects of college expansion are either canceling each other
out or they are not sufficiently strong to shift the equilibrium skill prices and their distribution. By
attracting marginal students with lower returns, college expansion may alter the aggregate com-
position of college graduates and thus put a downward pressure on the average returns to college.
However, the composition effect in our estimates is intertwined with the price effect that partly
could be demand-driven. That is, skill-biased demand shocks along with the positive productivity
22Results are shown in web appendix.
23See Table C.1 for the list of covariates. The MTE estimates are not sensitive if the IPW correction is performed
separately for missing wages among the employed due to non-reporting (15 percent of all missing wages) and for
missing wages due to non-employment. The probit models and MTE estimates with IPW for different sources of
missing data are shown in web appendix.
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spillovers from the increased stock of human capital may compensate for the supply-side effects
keeping the equilibrium college wage premium constant over time. Disentangling these varying
general equilibrium effects of college expansion remains an area for future empirical analysis. The
policy treatment parameters discussed in the next section should be interpreted from a partial equi-
librium perspective.
2.5 Policy Treatment Parameters
2.5.1 Conventional Treatment Parameters
Recall the gross returns to college education are given by ∆i = Yi,1− Yi,0 = (X ′iβ1−X ′iβ0) +
(i,1 − i,0), with E(∆iXi) = E[(β1 − β0)|Xi]. Following Heckman and Li (2004), the probability
limit of the OLS estimator can be written as:
plim(∆ˆOLS) = E(Yi|Xi, Si = 1)− E(Yi|Xi, Si = 0) (2.13)
= E(X ′iβ1 + i,1|Xi, Si = 1)− E(X ′iβ0 + i,0|Xi, Si = 0) (2.14)
= E(∆i|Xi) + E(εi,1|Si = 1)− E(εi,0|Si = 0) (2.15)
= E(∆i|Xi)︸ ︷︷ ︸
”ATE”
+E(εi,1 − εi,0|Si = 1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
”Sortinggain”
+ [E(εi,0|Si = 1)− E(εi,0|Si = 0)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
”SelectionBias”
(2.16)
= E(∆i|Xi, Si = 1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
”TT”
+ [E(εi,0|Si = 1)− E(εi,0|Si = 0)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
”SelectionBias”
where ATE= E(∆i|Xi) is the average treatment effect of college education for a randomly
chosen individual; TT= E(∆i|Xi, Si = 1) is the treatment effect on the treated; the sorting gain,
E(εi,1−εi,0|Si = 1)=TT-ATE, is the mean gain of the unobservables for people who select college,
and the selection bias [E(εi,0|Si = 1) − E(εi,0|Si = 0)] = OLS - TT is the mean difference in
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unobservables between secondary school graduates and college graduates if the latter would not
go to college.
In Table 2.7, we report the above treatment parameters, which are constructed by integrating
MTE with the appropriate weights developed by Heckman and Vytlacil (2005) (Appendix Table
C3). Standard errors are bootstrapped, and all parameters are annualized. For a randomly chosen
individual, the average treatment effect of one year of college education is about 7.3 percent. The
treatment effect on the treated is a 13 percent wage increase for college graduates compared with
what they would receive without college degree. At the same time, the treatment effect on the
untreated (TUT) is only 1.9 percent wage increase for secondary school graduates if they would
go to college. The OLS estimate is 7.7 percent. We estimate the sorting gain of 5.7 percent and the
selection bias of 5.3 percent. Positive sorting gain, E(εi,1−εi,0|Si = 1) > 0, implies that individu-
als sort into college on the basis of unobserved gains. Negative selection bias means that if college
graduates did not complete college education, they would be worse off in terms of the unobserved
wage component in comparison with secondary school graduates, E(εi,0|Si = 1) < E(εi,0|Si = 0).
In other words, both college and secondary school graduates have a comparative advantage in the
labor market, which is consistent with the analysis of Willis and Rosens (1979) seminal paper. An
IV estimate of the returns to college (with the propensity score pˆ used as IV) is 16.1 percent, and it
is predictably upward biased compared to ATE due to heterogeneity (εi,1 6= εi,0) and positive sort-
ing gain. As evident from Appendix Figure C1, the IV estimand weighs a higher valued segment
of MTE(x, ν) more heavily.
2.5.2 Policy Effects
In addition to conventional treatment parameters, we also estimate the treatment effect for in-
dividuals at the margin of indifference between going and not going to college (µS(Zi) = i). As
shown by Carneiro and Vytlacil (2010), the marginal treatment effect at the indifference point is
equivalent to the effect of the marginal policy change, which is college expansion in our case. Fol-
lowing Carneiro and Vytlacil (2010), we assess the marginal returns to college for three alternative
policy regimes. The first policy exogenously increases the probability of graduating from college
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by an infinitesimal amount α, so that Pα = P (Z) + α. An alternative policy changes the proba-
bility of college by a tiny proportion (1 + α), Pα = (1 + α)P (Z). The third policy may involve a
small change in one of the continuous components of Z. In our Z vector, we have a direct measure
of college expansion, Nm,t, which is the number of campuses in the municipality of residence m in
year t (corresponding to age 17), such that Pα = P (Nm,t+α).24 Using equation (8.10) and weights
provided in Appendix Table C3 and Figure C1, we calculate marginal policy-relevant treatment ef-
fects of three policy regimes from the normal selection model and report them in Table 2.8, Panel
A. Similar to Carneiro and Vytlacil (2010), we find that the MPRTE for a marginal additive change
in P is estimated to be higher (9.9 percent) than the MPRTE for a marginal proportional change
in P (7.4 percent), but the estimates for Russia are greater in magnitude in both cases. The third
policy regime, which is more explicit and not yet reported in the literature, has returns of 9.6 per-
cent per one year of college for a marginal person who is indifferent between going or not going
to college and who would change college participation in response to a marginal increase in the
number of campuses.
Alternatively, we report MPRTE parameters from the MTE distribution estimated using a semi-
parametric method of local IV. The estimation process is described in Section 2, and the MTE
estimates, evaluated at mean values of X , are plotted with 90-percent confidence bands in Figure
2.4. We find that the semi-parametric method produces MTE with the same shape as the parametric
one, but with somewhat larger standard errors. Similar to the normal model, the MTE is declining
in ν, and we reject the null hypothesis that the returns to college are not correlated with S or that
MTE(x, ν) is constant in ν based on the test results reported in Appendix Table C2. The common
support of the P (Z) estimated from our sample ranges from a minimum of 0.070 to a maximum
of 0.938.25 Panel B of Table 2.8 presents the MPRTE parameters from the semi-parametric model
24In our sample, the number of campuses per municipality varies from 0 to 299 and is treated as a continuous
variable. An infinitesimal change in Nm,t can be interpreted as a new classroom or an additional student slot in a
locality.
25Common support is defined as the intersection of the support of P (Z) given S = 1 and the support of P (Z) given
S = 0. 76 observations, or 0.4 percent of our sample, fall outside the common support.
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for the three alternative policy regimes described above.26 In particular, the MPRTE for a marginal
change in the number of campuses is estimated to be 10.7 percent wage increase for one year
of college. These estimates are only slightly higher (by about one percentage point) than the
MPRTE estimates from the normal model, so we adhere to our earlier conclusions with regard to
the marginal returns to college. Regardless of the method, we find that a marginal student at the
indifference point enjoys relatively high returns to college in Russia, even though his returns are,
as expected, lower than those earned by current college graduates (TT).
Next, we perform a few policy experiments for a discrete change in the number of campuses.
The experiments are evaluated using the policy-relevant treatment effect (PRTE) estimator pro-
posed by Heckman and Vytlacil (2001) and given in equation (8.8).27 In our case, PRTE captures
the average MTE for the individuals who changed college participation in response to a fixed in-
crease in the number of campuses from the 1992 pre-expansion level, PPRTE = P (Nm,92+∆Nm,t).
In the first simulation, we add one campus in each municipality to the 1992 level in 1993-2003 and
find the PRTE returns to be 9.8 percent wage increase per year of college. In the second set of sim-
ulations, we add one campus per municipality in different locations. Results in Table 2.8, Panel
C show that the returns to college vary depending on the place where campuses are established.
The returns are estimated to be larger for constrained municipalities, including smaller non-capital
cities, rural districts, and municipalities that did not have institutions of higher education in 1992
(9.9 percent wage increase in all three cases). At the same time, the opening of a campus in local-
ities with previously existing campuses or in the largest regional cities-capitals attracts individuals
with lower returns to college (7.7 and 7.5 percent, respectively).
In the final set of simulations, we ask what would the returns to college be for the affected
individuals (those who shifted to treatment) if the number of campuses increased by only a half
26A MPRTE parameter is a weighted average of the MTE values estimated semi-parametrically on the basis of
equation (8.12). The MPRTE weights are reported in Appendix Table C3 and also plotted in Figure C1.
27The PRTE requires that the empirical support of the distribution of P (Z) to be within the unit interval, and that the
empirical support of Pα has to be contained in the support of P (Z). These conditions are satisfied in our setting. Given
the multivariate normal structure of the errors, the support of P (Z) is the unit interval by construction. Additionally,
the empirical support of P (Z) is given by (0.044, 0.949), while the empirical support of Pα is (0.045, 0.949) for
α = 1.
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of the actual increase, Nm,t∗ = Nm,92 + 12(Nm,t − Nm,92), or by 50 percent more of the actual
increase, Nm,t∗ = Nm,92 + 32(Nm,t−Nm,92). Compared to earlier simulations in Panel C where we
add uniformly one campus in selected municipalities, here we simulate changes which are large in
magnitude and varying in size depending on the scale of actual college expansion in each munici-
pality. On average, four additional campuses per municipality were established between 1992 and
2003. Predictably, more sizeable college expansions attract individuals with lower returns, though
the scale effect is not linear. PRTE is estimated to be 9.8 percent for a one-campus establishment
policy, 8 percent for half expansion, 6 percent for full expansion, and 6.2 percent for 1.5 of actual
expansion.
Our PRTE estimates of the returns to college imply that the present value of additional earnings
stream for a marginal student over a 33-year working life (age 22-55) is equal to about $41,657
gains in non-capital cities vs. $36,261 in capital cities (see details of calculations in Appendix
Table C4). The difference in net benefits between the two types of cities is even greater, since
students in capital cities, on average, pay more tuition and forego higher earnings while in school
compared to students in smaller cities. A rough cost-benefit calculation in Table C4 suggests that
the net present benefits for a marginal student amount to $15,357 in non-capital cities and $7,334
in capital cities after subtracting the present value of foregone earnings, average tuition and other
college-related expenses. Considering that relocation to a large city imposes additional costs (e.g.,
transportation, greater living expenses, etc.), new students in constrained municipalities clearly
benefited from college openings in the place of their residence. The stock of human capital in the
remote labor markets is also likely to increase, as college graduates tend to stay in the area where
they receive their education (Groen (2004); Winters (2011)).
2.6 Conclusion
This chapter estimates marginal returns to college education in Russia. Despite the vast differ-
ences in labor market institutions and data characteristics between Russia and the U.S., our results
are consistent with the previous U.S. literature on MTE in that we also find (i) a large degree of
heterogeneity in returns to college, varying from -18 to 33 percent increase in lifetime wages for
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a year of college; (ii) a negatively-sloped MTE showing greater marginal benefits from college
among individuals with the highest propensity to go to college; (iii) the positive sorting of indi-
viduals into college based on observed and unobserved market gains associated with college; (iv)
lower returns for a marginal student than for an average student (10 vs. 13 percent per year of
college); (v) a larger IV estimate of the returns to college compared to an OLS estimate; 16 and
8 percent, respectively. Implicitly these results support the MTE approach and the need for the
precise characterization of different treatment parameters.
The main focus of this study is on the evaluation of the large-scale college expansion that
occurred in Russia and resulted in mass openings of new colleges, both public and private, and
their branches in many localities where college education was not previously offered. Specifically,
we are interested in the returns of the marginal individual who switched into treatment as a result
of college expansion. Unlike previous MTE studies where college expansion is characterized by
an exogenous hypothetical shift in the probability of attending college by some random amount or
proportion, we evaluate actual, real-world college expansion using the number of campuses (and
their types) at a highly disaggregated level of municipality.
We establish that individuals with lower returns enter colleges as more campuses open. How-
ever, for the marginal individuals who are affected by the establishment of an additional campus
at the time of making a college decision, the overall gains from attending college are large and
positive; we estimate a 10 percent wage gain for these individuals. Furthermore, we find that the
opening of a new campus in constrained municipalities - smaller non-capital cities or municipali-
ties that did not have institutions of higher education before college expansion - attracts students
with higher returns compared to the effect of the same policy in unconstrained municipalities with
at least one college existing before the expansion. Our policy estimate also indicates that if the
number of campuses per municipality did not increase, then a considerable share of population
with high potential labor market gains from college would not have been able to realize these gains
in the market.
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Other results highlight the important distinction between public and private colleges and be-
tween main campuses and branches and show that public campuses and local branches are es-
timated to be more effective in influencing local college participation. We also find the college
probability function to be concave with respect to the number of campuses, with a very large kink
point for the first campus opened in a locality. The effect of each additional campus on the local
college attainment diminishes and eventually vanishes in college-rich locations such as Moscow
city.
Overall, our findings show the direction for future policies targeted at expanding college ed-
ucation in developing countries and identifying locations for the future college construction that
would attract individuals with the highest potential gains from additional education.
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Table 2.1: Variables in Wage and College Equations
Variable Time frame Level of Common Wage eq College eq
aggregation XS XW E and I
Female Fixed individual x
Urban residence Fixed individual x
Ethnically Russian Fixed individual x
Mother’s education Fixed individual x
Age, age squared Current year individual x
Birth cohorts Fixed individual x
Federal districts Current year individual x
Federal districts at 17 Age 17 individual x
Survey year dummies Current year individual x
Regional cohort size at 17 Age 17 region x
Permanent regional earnings Fixed region x
Permanent unemployment rate Fixed region x
Transitory regional earnings Current year region x
Transitory unemployment rate Current year region x
Regional earnings at 17 Age 17 region x
Unemployment rate at 17 Age 17 region x
Skill wage ratio at 17 Age 17 country x
Number of campuses at 17 Age 17 municipality x
Notes: The XW includes wage determinants; E is the number of campuses in the municipality of residence at age
17; the I vector includes other exclusion restrictions in the college decision equation; and the common vector XS
belongs to both equations.
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Table 2.2: Variance Decomposition for the Number of Campuses
Variables Mean Total Within- Between-
Variance municipality municipality
% %
Total number of campuses 1.43 77.3 86.8 13.3
Number of colleges - public 0.77 22.3 99.4 0.6
Number of colleges - private 0.27 17.5 59.6 40.4
Number of branches - public 0.33 1.0 68.3 31.8
Number of branches - private 0.07 0.2 44.9 55.1
Notes: The number of campuses, colleges, and branches is calculated for every municipality in the RLMS estimation
sample. The panel of municipalities used in the variance decomposition is balanced with 733 municipalities and 19
time periods from 1985 to 2003. A campus refers to all buildings of the same college in one municipality. Branch is a
campus located outside the municipality of the main campus. Total number of campuses is the sum of the number of
main campuses (which is equivalent to the number of colleges) and the number of branches.
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Table 2.3: Sample Statistics
S = 0 S = 1 Mean
(N = 10,962) (N = 6,949) comparison
t-test (p-value)
Hourly wage rate (log) 3.831 4.286 0.000
(0.751) (0.721)
Age 32.855 31.919 0.000
(4.808) (4.708)
Regional transitory earnings (log) 0.020 0.013 0.001
(0.139) (0.146)
Regional transitory unemployment rate, % 0.111 0.239 0.000
(1.687) (1.641)
Female 0.492 0.606 0.000
(0.500) (0.489)
Urban residence (binary) 0.754 0.873 0.000
(0.431) (0.333)
Ethnically Russian (binary) 0.907 0.911 0.319
(0.291) (0.284)
Mother’s education (binary) 0.067 0.302 0.000
(0.249) (0.459)
Mother’s education missing (binary) 0.117 0.115 0.648
(0.322) (0.319)
Regional cohort size at 17 (log) 10.456 10.551 0.000
(0.610) (0.674)
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S = 0 S = 1 Mean
(N = 10,962) (N = 6,949) comparison
t-test (p-value)
Regional permanent earnings (log) 8.519 8.626 0.000
(0.387) (0.396)
Regional permanent unemployment rate, % 6.841 6.201 0.000
(2.615) (2.886)
N of campuses per municipality 11.879 26.432 0.000
(36.070) (57.131)
Municipality with no campuses (binary) 0.465 0.260 0.000
(0.499) (0.439)
Skill wage ratio at 17 0.760 0.725 0.000
(0.128) (0.126)
Regional earnings at 17 (log) 7.875 7.844 0.000
(0.463) (0.460)
Regional unemployment rate at 17, % 4.817 5.808 0.000
(5.209) (5.164)
Notes: Descriptive statistics are provided for the baseline estimation sample (age ≥ 25, age 17 ∈ [1985, 2003], wage
∈ [2004, 2011], and non-missing variables). The t-test compares means of variables between college graduates (S=1)
and graduates of secondary schools (S=0). The definition of all variables is described in Appendix Table C1.
Standard deviations are in parentheses.
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Table 2.4: Maximum Likelihood Estimates of the Normal Switching Regression Model
Variables Wage equations College equation
S=0 S=1 Coefficients ME
Age 0.013 0.055*** ... ...
(0.015) (0.019)
Age squared -0.001 -0.060** ... ...
(0.023) (0.028)
Regional transitory earnings (log) 0.733*** 0.780*** ... ...
(0.095) (0.119)
Regional transitory unemployment rate, % 0.010** -0.001 ... ...
(0.005) (0.006)
Female -0.465*** -0.239*** 0.374*** 0.142***
(0.013) (0.017) (0.020) (0.008)
Urban residence (binary) 0.212*** 0.308*** 0.183*** 0.069***
(0.015) (0.024) (0.031) (0.011)
Ethnically Russian (binary) -0.040** -0.015 -0.065* -0.027*
(0.019) (0.024) (0.038) (0.015)
Mother’s education (binary) -0.041 0.167*** 1.053*** 0.403***
(0.034) (0.036) (0.029) (0.010)
Mother’s education missing (binary) -0.021 0.110*** 0.156*** 0.059***
(0.017) (0.023) (0.031) (0.012)
Regional cohort size at 17 (log) 0.191*** 0.064*** -0.181*** -0.066***
(0.017) (0.018) (0.026) (0.010)
Regional permanent earnings (log) 0.618*** 0.796*** 0.281*** 0.112***
(0.040) (0.051) (0.051) (0.019)
Regional permanent unemployment rate, % 0.020*** 0.003 -0.000 0.002
(0.005) (0.006) (0.009) (0.003)
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Variables Wage equations College equation
S=0 S=1 Coefficients ME
Instruments
N of campuses per municipality ... ... 0.011*** 0.005***
(0.001) (0.000)
N of campuses per municipality squared/100 ... ... -0.003*** -0.001***
(0.000) (0.000)
Municipality with no campuses (binary) ... ... -0.312*** -0.110***
(0.026) (0.010)
Skill wage ratio at 17 ... ... -1.313*** -0.527***
(0.368) (0.145)
Regional earnings at 17 (log) ... ... 0.040 0.016
(0.043) (0.017)
Regional unemployment rate at 17, % ... ... -0.007 -0.003
(0.006) (0.002)
σˆ1 − σˆ0 = −0.372∗∗∗(0.065)
X¯(βˆ1 − βˆ0) = 0.330∗∗∗(0.057); annualized=7.3
χ2 - test for joint significance of instruments = 360.9***
χ2 - test for independence of equations = 40.6***
Notes: *** Significant at 1%. ** Significant at 5 %. * Significant at 10 %. N = 17,911 (age ≥ 25, age 17 ∈ [1985,
2003], wage ∈ [2004, 2011], and non-missing variables). This table shows the maximum likelihood estimates of
wage and college equations for the normal switching regression model. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
The standard error of (σ1 − σ0) is computed using the Delta method. The college equation also includes dummies
for four cohorts, Moscow residence at age 17, and seven federal districts at age 17; wage equations include dummies
for survey years, current Moscow residence, and seven federal districts at the time of the survey.
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Table 2.5: College Equation: Alternative Set of Instruments
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
N of colleges (main campuses) 0.007*** ... ... ... ...
(0.002)
N of colleges squared/100 -0.002*** ... ... ... ...
(0.000)
N of branches 0.065*** ... ... ... ...
(0.013)
N of branches squared/100 -0.287*** ... ... ... ...
(0.100)
Municipality with no campuses (dummy) -0.258*** -0.250*** -0.324*** -0.276*** -0.312***
(0.030) (0.029) (0.026) (0.027) (0.026)
N of public campuses ... 0.024*** ... ... ...
(0.002)
N of public campuses squared/100 ... -0.018*** ... ... ...
(0.003)
Municipality with a private campus (dummy) ... -0.008 ... ... ...
(0.031)
N of campuses ... ... 0.009*** ... 0.011***
(0.001) (0.001)
x Moscow residency at 17 ... ... -0.009*** ... ...
(0.001)
N of public colleges ... ... ... 0.025*** ...
(0.002)
N of public colleges squared/100 ... ... ... -0.020*** ...
(0.003)
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Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
N of campuses squared/100 ... ... ... ... -0.003***
(0.000)
Change in N of campuses between ages 25-30 ... ... ... ... -0.001
(0.001)
σ1 − σ0 -0.353*** -0.352*** -0.387*** -0.373*** -0.370***
(0.066) (0.066) (0.063) (0.064) (0.066)
X¯(βˆ1 − βˆ0) 0.374*** 0.369*** 0.318*** 0.347*** 0.338***
(0.061) (0.060) (0.054) (0.058) (0.059)
χ2 - test for joint significance of instruments 388.4 412.2 352.3 394.4 362.1
p -value [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
χ2 - test for independence of equations 49.6 49.2 44.0 50.3 41.6
p -value [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Log-likelihood -24,466 -24,451 -24,480 -24,460 -24,476
Notes: *** Significant at 1%. ** Significant at 5 %. * Significant at 10 %. N=17,911. Table shows the maximum
likelihood estimates of the coefficients of the N of campuses per municipality in the college equation using
alternative definitions. The number of campuses, colleges, and branches is computed at the level of municipality. All
specifications use the same set of variables and the same sample constraints as in the baseline specification reported
in Table A.4 (age ≥ 25, age 17 ∈ [1985, 2003], wage ∈ [2004, 2011], and non-missing variables). The standard error
of (σ1 − σ0) is computed using the Delta method. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
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Table 2.6: Switching Regression Model Parameters from Alternative Specifications
Includes 10-year Soviet IPW Wage
dropouts earnings earnings 1995-2011
average
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
σˆ1 − σˆ0 -0.363 -0.353 -0.365 -0.369 -0.355
(0.064) (0.070) (0.064) (0.053) (0.061)
X¯(βˆ1 − βˆ0) 0.345 0.367 0.355 0.397 0.434
(0.054) (0.077) (0.064) (0.047) (0.057)
χ2 - test for joint significance of instruments 370.6 164.0 170.1 517.3 237.8
p -value [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
χ2 - test for independence of equations 39.4 41.2 40.6 32.1 81.5
p -value [0.003] [0.003] [0.001] [0.000] [0.000]
Log-likelihood -26,100 -24,680 -24,750 -30,589 -31,592
Number of observations 18,823 17,911 17,911 17,911 22,584
Notes: Table reports statistics for alternative specifications of the normal switching regression model. Unless noted
otherwise, all specifications use the same set of variables and the same sample constraints as in the baseline
specification reported in Table A.4 (age ≥ 25, age 17 ∈ [1985, 2003], wage ∈ [2004, 2011], and non-missing
variables). In column 1, the treatment group, S=1, includes college dropouts with three or more years of college. In
column 2, we use an alternative definition of regional permanent earnings calculated as average regional earnings
over the first ten years since college decision at age 17. The specification in column 3 applies the same definition as
in column 2 but replaces permanent earnings with the Soviet period average regional earnings (1980-1991) for
individuals who turned 17 before market reforms. In column 4, we apply the inverse propensity weight from the
probit model of non-missing wages on covariates XS and XW . In column 5, wage ∈ [1995, 2011]. The standard
error of (σˆ1 − σˆ0) is computed using the Delta method. Robust standard errors are in parentheses, and p-values are
in brackets.
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Table 2.7: Treatment Parameters
Treatment Parameter Estimates Return
Average Treatment Effect (ATE) 0.073
(0.026)
Treatment on the Treated (TT) 0.130
(0.041)
Treatment on the Untreated (TUT) 0.019
(0.020)
Instrumental Variables (IV) 0.161
(0.051)
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 0.077
(0.024)
Sorting gain (TT - ATE) 0.057
Selection bias (OLS - TT) -0.053
Notes: The standard treatment parameters are obtained by integrating the MTE(x, ν) using weighting functions of
Heckman and Vytlacil (2005):
Parameter(x) =
∫ 1
0
MTE(x, ν)hj(x, ν)dν, wherej = ATE, TT, TUT, IV,OLS
The weighting functions hj(x, ν) are defined in Appendix Table C3. Linear IV estimates use P (Z) as an instrument.
Bootstrapped standard errors are in parentheses (250 replications). The reported returns are annualized by dividing
the estimates by 4.5, which is the difference in average years of schooling between treatment and control groups.
Table reports the results under baseline specification (Table A.4).
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Table 2.8: Policy Parameters
Policy Experiment Policy Parameter
Panel A: MPRTE from the normal selection model (for infinitesimal α)
Pα = P (Z) + α 0.099
(0.011)
Pα = (1 + α)P (Z) 0.074
(0.013)
Pα = P (Nm,t + α) 0.096
(0.011)
Panel B: MPRTE from the semi-parametric model (for infinitesimal α)
Pα = P (Z) + α 0.110
(0.012)
Pα = (1 + α)P (Z) 0.086
(0.014)
Pα = P (Nm,t + α) 0.107
(0.012)
Panel C: PRTE from policy simulations
Adding a campus in each municipality 0.098
N∗m,t = Nm,92 + 1 (0.011)
Opening a first campus in 1993-2003 0.099
N∗m,t = 1 if Nm,92 = 0, t ∈ [1993, 2003] (0.011)
Opening an additional campus in 1993-2003 0.077
N∗m,t = Nm,92 + 1 if Nm,92 > 0, t ∈ [1993, 2003] (0.012)
Adding a campus in capital cities in 1993-2003 0.075
N∗m,t = Nm,92 + 1, t ∈ [1993, 2003] (0.012)
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Policy Experiment Policy Parameter
Adding a campus in non-capital cities in 1993-2003 0.099
N∗m,t = Nm,92 + 1, t ∈ [1993, 2003] (0.010)
Adding a campus in rural districts in 1993-2003 0.099
N∗m,t = Nm,92 + 1, t ∈ [1993, 2003] (0.011)
50% of actual expansion 0.080
N∗m,t = Nm,92 +
1
2 (Nm,t −Nm,92) (0.012)
Actual expansion (Nm,t −Nm,92) 0.060
N∗m,t = Nm,t (0.013)
150% of actual expansion 0.062
N∗m,t = Nm,92 +
3
2 (Nm,t −Nm,92) (0.013)
Notes: Table reports marginal policy-relevant treatment effect (MPRTE) for the normal selection and
semi-parametric models as well as policy-relevant treatment effect (PRTE) from policy experiments. The reported
returns are per year of college. Nm,t is the number of campuses in the municipality of residence m at age 17 in year
t; N∗m,t is the simulated number of campuses. The MTE estimates are based on equation (2.8) in Panels A and C;
equation (2.12) in Panel B. The MPRTE are obtained by integrating the MTE(x, ν) using the weighting functions
reported in Appendix Table C3. The reported PRTE estimates are computed using Quasi-Monte Carlo simulation
with Halton sequences; these estimates are essentially identical to the PRTE estimates based on the PRTE weighting
function. Bootstrapped standard errors are in parentheses (250 replications).
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Figure 2.1: Average Returns to College Education in Russia
Notes: Returns to college education are calculated from the OLS regression of the log of monthly earnings at primary
job on college degree, gender, age, age squared, urban place of birth, a dummy for Russian nationality, and seven
federal districts. The comparison group includes graduates of general and professional secondary schools, but
excludes college drop-outs. Earnings for 1985 and 1990 are reported retrospectively. Estimation is performed for
each year separately using the sample of 25- to 55-year olds. Reported are the estimated coefficients on college
degree and the overall trend fitted using non-parametric smoothing (lowess; bandwidth=0.4). Returns are in percent
and per year of college (divided by 4.5). Also shown is the 90
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Figure 2.2: Trends in Key Variables
Notes: Panel A shows the percent share of college graduates in RLMS among 25-44-year old individuals. The
comparison group includes graduates of general and professional secondary schools, but excludes college drop-outs.
Panel B depicts the average size of 17-year-old population in thousands people across all Russian regions. Vertical
lines define the sample period from 1985 to 2003. Also shown is the 90
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Figure 2.3: Marginal Treatment Effect Estimated from a Normal Selection Model
Notes: The figure plots the MTE estimates for a grid of values v between zero and one, with a 90-percent confidence
interval, evaluated at mean values of X. We estimate a parametric normal selection model given in equations
(2.1)-(2.4) by maximum likelihood. The figure is computed using equation (2.8) and the estimated parameters in
Table A.4. The fixed covariance component of MTE(x, ν) is given by σˆ1 − σˆ0=-0.372 with a standard error of
0.065. The reported returns are per year of college. The standard errors are computed using the Delta method.
90
Figure 2.4: Marginal Treatment Effect Estimated from a Semi-Parametric Model with Local IV
Notes: The figure plots the MTE estimates for a grid of values v between zero and one, with a 90-percent confidence
interval, evaluated at mean values of X. Estimation steps are described in Section 2. The estimation is performed
using a Robinson’s (1988) double residual estimator to obtain the non-linear relation between the log of wages and pˆ,
where pˆ is the predicted probability of graduating from college. Then, we use a Kernel quadratic local polynomial
regression to evaluate the derivatives of equation (8.11), K ′(pˆ), with a bandwidth of 0.32. The reported returns are
per year of college. 90 percent standard error bands are calculated using the bootstrap (250 replications).
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Figure 2.5: Average Treatment Effect Estimates for Different Sample Periods
Notes: ATE = X¯(βˆ1 − βˆ0);MTEslope = σˆ1 − σˆ0. Figure reports the average returns to college (ATE) and the
MTE slope along with the 95-percent confidence interval under the baseline specification by adding/subtracting one
additional survey year to preserve the panel features of wage series. The last year of each survey period is always
2011 to keep the college decision period (1985-2003) constant for comparability purposes. Year indicates the
beginning of the survey period. The red line corresponds to the baseline estimates for the 2004-2011 survey period
(Table A.4).
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APPENDIX A
DESCRIPTION OF THE VARIABLES I
Table A.1: Description of the Variables
Variable name Definition
A. Individual-Level Variables
Actual years of schooling The sum of the years of schooling at all levels of education, including
multiple degrees at the same level
Potential experience (Age-actual years of schooling - 6)
Hourly wage rate Usual monthly earnings divided by usual monthly hours of work at the
primary job. Adjusted for inflation using yearly CPI (year 2000 is
the base year).
Region of residence 33 subjects of the Russian Federation or regions, Moscow and
Leningrad regions include Moscow city and St. Petersburg, respectively.
B. Region-Level Variables
Share of men with Share of male population older than 15 with complete higher education.
higher education The share varies by region, type of location (urban vs. rural), and age.
Sources: Russian Census 2002, 2010; Demoscope Weekly
(www.demoscope.ru/); values in 1995-2001 are imputed based on the
shares in 1989 and 2002 for a given cohort, values in 2003-2009, 2011
are imputed based on the share in 2010 for a given cohort.
Share of women with Share of female population older than 15 with complete higher education.
higher education The share varies by region, type of location (urban vs. rural), and age.
Sources: Russian Census 2002, 2010; Demoscope Weekly
(www.demoscope.ru/); values in 1995-2001 are imputed based on the
shares in 1989 and 2002 for a given cohort, values in 2003-2009, 2011
are imputed based on the share in 2010 for a given cohort.
Unemployment rate Regional level of unemployment, percent.
Sources: Labor and Employment (various years); Population Survey on
Employment (various years)
Number of Total number of campuses of higher education institutions located
campuses in the region of current residence twenty years ago.
Sources: Russian University Database
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Table A.2: Classification of Industries
Economic activity 1994 1995-2002 2003-2004 2005-2010 2011
1. Manufacturing Manufacturing Manufacturing Manufacturing Mining, Mining,
quarrying, quarrying,
oil and gas oil and gas
extraction extraction
2. Agriculture Agriculture, Agriculture, Agriculture Agriculture Agriculture
forestry forestry
3. Construction Construction Construction Construction Construction Construction
4. Transportation Transportation, Transportation, Transportation, Transportation, Transportation,
communications communications utilities utilities utilities
5. Wholesale and Trade, catering, Wholesale, Wholesale, Wholesale, Wholesale,
retail trade logistics, retail trade, retail trade retail trade, retail trade,
distribution catering repair of motor repair of motor
and supply vehicles, vehicles,
and supply motorcycles, motorcycles,
personal and personal and
household goods household goods
for personal use for personal use
6. Health care Healthcare, Healthcare, Healthcare, Healthcare, Healthcare,
physical culture, physical culture, physical culture, social services, social services,
social security social security social security
7. Education Education, Education, Education, Education, Education,
culture, art, culture, art,
science and science and
scientific scientific
services services
8. Other Information, Information, Housing, Hotels, Hotels,
computer computer communal restairants; restairants;
sciences; sciences; services; financial real
general general personal activity; estate,
commercial commercial services of real estate, renting and
activities to activities to population; renting and business
support the support the culture and arts; business activities,
market and market and science and activities; social and
real estate real estate scientific public personal
transactions transactions services administration services
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Table A.3: Estimates of Education Externalities by Education Group
Men Women Men Women Men Women Men Women
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
A. Some college or more
College share, 0.023*** 0.027*** 0.014*** 0.019*** 0.012*** 0.019*** 0.015*** -0.000
men (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004)
College share, -0.000 -0.006 0.002 -0.003 0.001 -0.004 -0.007* 0.006*
women (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
Education 0.025*** 0.009** 0.026*** 0.011*** 0.022*** 0.011** 0.012*** 0.008**
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
Experience 0.018*** 0.023*** 0.021*** 0.026*** 0.022*** 0.027*** 0.027*** 0.032***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Experience -0.054*** -0.059*** -0.058*** -0.063*** -0.064*** -0.069*** -0.081*** -0.073***
squared/100 (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006)
Constant -0.245*** -0.364*** 0.154 -0.089 1.438*** 1.072*** 1.082*** 0.849***
(0.084) (0.086) (0.122) (0.112) (0.125) (0.121) (0.116) (0.096)
R2 0.78 0.76 0.79 0.76 0.71 0.69 0.75 0.74
N 10,047 13,479 10,047 13,479 9,126 12,511 9,126 12,511
B. Less than college
College share, 0.023*** 0.025*** 0.018*** 0.018*** 0.017*** 0.020*** 0.029*** 0.015***
men (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003)
College share, 0.005 0.001 0.007* 0.004 0.005 0.001 -0.011*** -0.004
women (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002)
Education 0.044*** 0.054*** 0.044*** 0.057*** 0.047*** 0.056*** 0.031*** 0.054***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
Experience 0.003 0.008*** 0.004** 0.010*** 0.006*** 0.010*** 0.008*** 0.018***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Experience -0.016*** -0.014*** -0.018*** -0.017*** -0.024*** -0.018*** -0.036*** -0.040***
squared/100 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006)
Constant -0.678*** -1.234*** -0.427*** -0.939*** 0.653*** 0.280** 2.480***
(0.086) (0.085) (0.104) (0.104) (0.140) (0.118) () (0.081)
R2 0.78 0.78 0.78 0.78 0.72 0.72 0.78 0.77
N 30,074 27,181 30,074 27,181 26,705 24,378 26,705 24,378
Unemployment Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
KM index Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region FE Yes Yes
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Table A.4: Instrumental Variable Estimates - Endogenous Schooling
Men Women Men Women Men Women Men Women
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
A. Some college or more
First stage
Number of 0.226*** 0.215*** 0.208*** 0.195*** 0.190*** 0.178*** 0.112*** 0.124***
campuses (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.030) (0.027)
Military 0.186*** 0.203*** 0.182*** 0.203*** 0.170*** 0.159*** 0.188*** 0.129***
service (0.018) (0.022) (0.018) (0.022) (0.020) (0.025) (0.016) (0.020)
F test 937.17 1224.99 901.86 1179.30 878.64 1172.57 728.70 739.81
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Second stage
College share 0.031*** 0.039*** 0.024*** 0.040*** 0.021*** 0.045*** 0.062** 0.124
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.004) (0.025) (0.087)
Education -0.073*** -.342*** -0.061** -0.348*** -0.104*** -0.462*** -0.197*** -0.775
(0.025) (0.091) (0.025) (0.093) (0.029) (0.159) (0.066) (0.531)
Experience 0.010*** -0.000 0.013*** -0.000 0.011*** -0.008 -0.008 -0.072
(0.002) (0.005) (0.002) (0.005) (0.003) (0.008) (0.014) (0.074)
Experience -0.038*** -0.000 -0.045*** 0.002 -0.045*** 0.010 0.004 0.223
squared/100 (0.007) (0.009) (0.006) (0.010) (0.007) (0.013) (0.033) (0.224)
N 10,047 13,479 10,047 13,479 9,126 12,511 9,126 12,511
Unemployment Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
KM index Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region FE Yes Yes
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Men Women Men Women Men Women Men Women
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
B. Less than college
First stage
Number of 0.258*** 0.250*** 0.244*** 0.237*** 0.233*** 0.222*** 0.261*** 0.185***
campuses (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.022) (0.022)
Military 0.212*** 0.145*** 0.214*** 0.147*** 0.206*** 0.135*** 0.170*** 0.122***
service (0.012) (0.014) (0.012) (0.014) (0.013) (0.017) (0.010) (0.014)
F test 1942.73 2114.96 1867.36 2043.50 1815.83 1942.38 2216.76 1355.00
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Second stage
College share 0.034*** 0.038*** 0.027*** 0.033*** 0.023*** 0.035*** -0.11 0.008
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.007) (0.011)
Education -0.004 -0.011 0.022 0.008 0.027 0.023 0.131*** 0.105***
(0.021) (0.028) (0.021) (0.028) (0.023) (0.033) (0.032) (0.038)
Experience -0.000 -0.005* 0.003* -0.000 0.005** -0.002 0.028*** 0.022**
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.005) (0.009)
Experience -0.15*** 0.031*** -0.021*** 0.020*** -0.024*** 0.028*** -0.061*** -0.033
squared/100 (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.005) (0.008) (0.025)
N 30,074 27,181 30,074 27,181 26,705 24,378 26,705 24,378
Unempoyment Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
KM index Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region FE Yes Yes
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APPENDIX C
DESCRIPTION OF THE VARIABLES II
Table C.1: Description of Variables
General notes:
1. The source for all individual-level variables is RLMS.
2. Estimation sample covers 1995-1996, 1998, 2000-2011 time periods; variables are
available for all years, unless noted otherwise.
3. The sample is restricted to individuals born between 1968 and 1986 and older than
25 at the time of the survey.
4. Russian regions include two federal cities (Moscow city and St. Petersburg) and 81
territories, which are aggregated into seven federal districts.
5. Due to multiple changes in the administrative-territorial structure of Russia, all past
regional data are collected based on the classification of regions according to the 2008
amendment to the Constitution of the Russian Federation.
6. At the time of the survey, respondents resided in 32 regions, but they graduated
from universities located in 73 regions.
7. Municipality in RLMS is defined according to the 5-digit municipality code taken from
the National Classification of Administrative and Territorial Division (OKATO in Russian).
OKATO code consists of two digits for a region and three digits for either city or district
(county-equivalent) within a region.
8. Municipality at age 17 is the same as current municipality for individuals who moved
to current municipality before 17, finished secondary school in current location, or currently
reside in the place of their birth. Municipality at age 17 is the same as college location if
individuals resided in the same place before college. Municipality at age 17 is imputed by
randomly selecting a municipality for a given type of birthplace (city, township, and village)
within the region of current residence for individuals who did not attend college and moved
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to a new location after age 17. Municipality at age 17 is imputed by randomly selecting
a municipality for a given type of birthplace (city, township, and village) within the region of
college for individuals who attended college and moved to a new location after age 17.
Dependent Variables
Hourly wage rate (log) = Labor earnings per month at primary job / Hours of work per month
at primary job
Labor earnings per month are defined as:
- monthly average (over the last 12 months) after-tax labor earnings
for an employee [1998-2011];
- total accumulated wage debt divided by the number of months of
overdue wages for employees with wage arrears [1995-1996];
monetary portion of last month earnings for employees with no
wage arrears [1995-1996];
- monetary portion of last month earnings for self-employed;
self-employed include individuals reporting place of work other
than an organization as well as those involved in regular individual
economic activities [all years].
Hours of work per month are defined as follows:
- usual hours of work in a typical week times four [1998-2011];
- actual hours of work last month [1995-1996];
- unusually high hours are top coded at 480 hours per month
(16 hours per day times 30 days).
College degree (binary) Two alternative definitions:
(i) = 1 if an individual has a college degree or higher,
= 0 if an individual graduated from a general and/or
professional secondary school with credentials;
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(ii) = 1 if an individual has three or more years of college
education with or without college degree, = 0 if an individual
graduated from a general and/or professional secondary school.
Common vector XS
Female = 1 if female
Ethnically Russian (binary) = 1 if ethnicity is Russian
Mother’s education (binary) = 1 if mother has a college degree
Note: Available in 2006 and 2011 surveys; extrapolated to other
years based on individual panel id for cases of consistent reporting
of mother’s education.
Mother’s education is missing = 1 if mother’s education is missing
Regional cohort size at 17 (log) Log of 17-year old population in
the region of residence at the age of 17, 1985-2003.
Sources: Census 1979, 1989, 2002; Demoscope Weekly
(www.demoscope.ru/); Goskomstat Central Statistical
Database.
Regional permanent earnings (log) Three alternative definitions:
(i) Predicted earnings = predicted value from the regression of
the log of regional earnings on 83 regional dummies and
a quadratic trend, 1994-2011;
(ii) 10-year average earnings = the log of the average of
regional earnings over the first ten years since college decision
at age 17;
(iii) 10-year average with a structural break
= 10-year average earnings as in (ii) for 17-year olds in the
market economy after 1991;
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= the log of the average of regional earnings over the
1980-1991 period for 17-year olds in the Soviet period
before 1992.
Note: Regional earnings are the average monthly earnings
in a given year deflated in 2000 prices.
Sources: Goskomstat Central Statistical Database;
Labor and Employment (various years).
Regional permanent unemployment Predicted value from the regression of regional
rate, % unemployment rate on 83 regional dummies and a
quadratic trend, 1994-2011.
Note: Alternative definitions were not used because of
the lack of variation in the unemployment rate during the
Soviet period, when unemployment was considered to be
non-existent.
Sources: Goskomstat Central Statistical Database.
Wage equation only XW
Age, age squared Year of survey minus year of birth; the mode of birth
year is computed in cases of inconsistencies across rounds.
Regional transitory earnings (log) Residual from the regression of the log of regional earnings
on 83 regional dummies and a quadratic trend, 1994-2011.
Sources: Goskomstat Central Statistical Database;
Labor and Employment (various years).
Regional transitory unemployment Residual from the regression of regional unemployment
rate, % rate on 83 regional dummies and a quadratic trend, 1994-2011.
Sources: Goskomstat Central Statistical Database
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Federal districts (dummies) Set of dummies for residing in Moscow and seven federal
districts at the time of the interview.
College equation, E and I
N of campuses per municipality Total number of college campuses in the municipality of
residence at age 17, 1985-2003.
A campus refers to all buildings of the same college in one
municipality. Each college has a main campus; some colleges
may also have branches with campuses located in other
municipalities.
Subcategories of campuses include main campuses; branches;
public campuses; private campuses.
Sources: Russian University Database (Belskaya and
S. Peter, 2015).
Skill wage ratio at 17 Ratio of average wages of manual workers to average wages of
non-manual workers in the industrial sector (manufacturing +
mining + electricity + selected industrial services) at age 17,
1985-2003.
Sources: Russian yearbooks (annual issues from 1985 to 2003)
Regional earnings at 17 (log) Log of regional earnings in the region of residence at age 17,
1985-2003.
Note: Regional earnings are the average monthly earnings in a
given year deflated in 2000 prices.
Sources: Goskomstat Central Statistical Database;
Labor and Employment (various years).
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Regional unemployment at 17, % Unemployment rate in the region of residence at age 17,
1985-2003.
Note: Available for 1992-2003; assumed zero during the Soviet
period, when unemployment was considered to be non-existent.
Sources: Goskomstat Central Statistical Database.
Birth cohorts (dummies) Set of dummies for individuals born in 1985-1988,
1994-1998, and 1999-2003.
Federal districts at 17 (dummies) Set of dummies for living in Moscow and seven federal
districts at age 17.
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Table C.2: Tests for Selection on Gains
Panel A. Test of linearity of E[Yi|Xi = x, P (Zi) = p] using polynomials in P
Degree of Polynomial 2 3 4 5
p-value of joint test on nonlinear terms 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
106
Panel B. Test of equality of LATEs (H0 : LATEj − LATEj+1 = 0)
Ranges of ν for LATE Difference in p-value Joint
j j+1 LATEs p-value
(0.00, 0.04) (0.08, 0.12) 0.035 0.000 0.0000
(0.08, 0.12) (0.16, 0.20) 0.029 0.000
(0.16, 0.20) (0.24, 0.28) 0.025 0.000
(0.24, 0.28) (0.32, 0.36) 0.021 0.000
(0.32, 0.36) (0.40, 0.44) 0.019 0.000
(0.40, 0.44) (0.48, 0.52) 0.017 0.000
(0.48, 0.52) (0.56, 0.60) 0.016 0.000
(0.56, 0.60) (0.64, 0.68) 0.016 0.000
(0.64, 0.68) (0.72, 0.76) 0.017 0.000
(0.72, 0.76) (0.80, 0.84) 0.018 0.020
(0.80, 0.84) (0.88, 0.92) 0.019 0.044
(0.88, 0.92) (0.96, 1.00) 0.019 0.060
Notes to Panel A: Standard errors are bootstrapped (500 replications) to account for the fact that P is estimated. The
computation of the test includes two steps. First, we estimate a probit model of college equation and predict the
propensity score Pˆ (Z). Second, we estimate a linear regression of Y on X, X(Z) and Kj(Pˆ ), where Kj(Pˆ ) is a
polynomial of degree j = 2, 3, 4, 5. Each column presents the p-value of the test associated with the null hypothesis
that neither nonlinear term has an explanatory power for each polynomial.
Notes to Panel B: We compute the semi-parametric MTE as described in Section 2 and presented in Figure 12 using
250 bootstrap replications. LATE is the local average treatment effect, and it is defined as the average of MTE in each
of the equally-spaced intervals of ν, with the total of 13 non-overlapping intervals j separated by a distance of 0.04.
The null hypothesis is that the LATEs of two contiguous intervals are equal. The p-value for this null hypothesis is
shown in column 4. The p-value is the proportion of bootstrap b for which T jb > T
j in interval j, where
T j = |LATEj − LATEj+1| and T jb = |(LATEjb − LATEj+1b )− (LATEj − LATEj+1)| for b = 1, 250. The
last column reports the p-value associated with the null hypothesis that the differences across all adjacent LATEs are
different from zero. The joint p-value is the proportion of bootstrap b for which Cb > C, where
C =
∑
j(LATE
j − LATEj+1)2 for all j intervals and
Cb =
∑
j [(LATE
J
b − LATEj+1b )− (LATEj − LATEj+1)]2 for b = 1, 250 and all j and j+1 intervals.
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